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Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach  
When We Teach Posner 
Kate O’Neill ∗ 
It is not, in short, a good judicial opinion.  It is merely the greatest judi-
cial opinion of the last hundred years. To judge it by “scientific” standards 
is to miss the point.  It is a rhetorical masterpiece, and evidently rhetoric 
counts in law; otherwise the dissent in Lochner would be forgotten.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Evidently, rhetoric does count; otherwise we would not be teach-
ing so many opinions by Judge Richard A. Posner.2  This Essay will 
argue that Judge Posner uses certain rhetorical strategies to attract 
casebook editors and law professors to his opinions, and that the edi-
tors and professors happily succumb.3  As Judge Posner might say, 
“There is no crime in that.”  The frequency with which his opinions 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.  I am 
grateful to former Dean W.H. “Joe” Knight, Interim Dean Gregory Hicks, and former 
Associate Dean Lea Vaughn, and to the University of Washington Law School Foun-
dation for their support.  I am also indebted to the following faculty and library col-
leagues for their many helpful suggestions and comments: Thomas Andrews, Tom 
Cobb, Peter Nicolas, Michael Townsend, Lea Vaughn (again), Mary Whisner, and 
Louis Wolcher. 
 1 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 285–86 
(1988). 
 2 Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, appointed by 
Ronald Reagan in 1981.  The University of Chicago: The Law School, Faculty, 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).  He 
served as Chief Judge from 1993 to 2000.  Id.  From 1969 until his appointment, he 
was a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, and he continues to teach as a 
Senior Lecturer there.  Id.  Judge Posner is also one of the founding scholars of the 
“law and economics” movement.  See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007). 
 3 One reason for Judge Posner’s particular appeal now is that university law fac-
ulties face allegedly competing demands to develop a more sophisticated theoretical 
discipline and to teach professional practice.  See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., 
THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 4–7 (2007) [hereinafter THE CARNEGIE 
REPORT].  As a judge with major scholarly credentials, Judge Posner has been able to 
create a body of didactic literature in a genre that enables his audience to meet, or 
seem to meet, both demands efficiently—as he might say. 
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appear in the casebooks simply shows that they meet some demand in 
the market for legal educational texts. 
In this Essay I reflect about the nature of that demand4 and 
about why a kind of symbiosis has developed between this particular 
judge and the legal academy,5 and what that symbiosis might tell us 
about legal education today.6  I suspect that most law faculty assume 
Judge Posner’s opinions are anthologized because they provide ex-
amples, often controversial, of economic instrumentalism in judging, 
and they happen to be unusually clear and even entertainingly writ-
ten.  I also suspect that most faculty feel reasonably comfortable deal-
ing with Judge Posner’s opinions on the merits, whether or not they 
approve of his judicial philosophy or his particular resolution of a 
case.  The volume of scholarship devoted to the merits of Judge Pos-
ner’s opinions suggests such comfort. 
My focus is different.  I think Judge Posner’s rhetoric, not his 
economic analysis, is the principal reason his opinions are so com-
monly anthologized for students.  His rhetoric not only presents the 
substantive analysis in an intriguing way but also is itself a major part 
of the lesson students absorb.  Just as Justice Holmes’s rhetoric in 
Lochner7 ultimately changed minds and the law,8 so too, I think, Judge 
Posner’s rhetoric may change minds and the law.  His rhetoric power-
fully conveys attitudes about law and society that go well beyond a 
calculus of economic efficiency.  Yet, I will argue that these lessons 
are rarely identified, much less critiqued, in the typical law school 
classroom because most law professors focus on teaching doctrine 
and lack the training or supporting materials for engaging in rhetori-
cal analysis.  This Essay provides some of those materials and refer-
ences for those who would like to try such an approach. 
Judge Posner’s rhetoric is a good chunk of his message, not just 
the means by which he conveys it.  When the author is as skilled in 
rhetoric as Judge Posner, law professors’ inattention to rhetoric al-
lows students, and perhaps faculty as well, to receive more informa-
tion than they may consciously perceive as being communicated.  
Such inattention may produce lawyers who are less skilled in critical 
reading and less conscious of persuasive rhetorical strategies than 
they should be. 
 4 See infra Part IV. 
 5 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1379, 1388–91 (1995). 
 6 See infra Part IV. 
 7 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 8 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 394 (1990). 
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Casebooks do not just ignore rhetoric’s importance; they actively 
camouflage it.  Judge Posner constructs many of his opinions as edu-
cational texts for law students and faculty, but casebook editors pre-
sent them as if they were judicial opinions like any other—written 
primarily to justify a judgment in a case.  Thus, at least from the stu-
dent’s point of view, they are cloaked in authority that a substantively 
identical essay would lack.  I will argue that, as a result, Judge Posner 
is not only influencing several generations of lawyers in their under-
standing of legal doctrine but is also normalizing for them a specific 
judicial rhetorical approach to legal controversies. 
I do not intend this Essay as yet another critique of Judge Pos-
ner’s economic theories or of his judging, although some criticism of 
both may be inferred from my analysis of his rhetoric.  Instead, my 
principal target is the modern legal academy’s neglect of rhetoric as a 
subject worth studying.  That Judge Posner’s success in casebooks is 
cursorily and commonly attributed to his stature in law and econom-
ics or to his ability to “write well” is an especially vivid example of a 
long-standing bad habit of discounting authorship, context, and rhe-
toric in favor of doctrinal coverage in law schools. 
This Essay is meant to inspire more interest in law and rhetoric 
as a focus of direct inquiry—rather than as a marginal topic or a skill 
confined to a first-year legal writing class—and bring a new perspec-
tive to the eternal debate about what law students should learn in law 
school.9 
Part II of this Essay summarizes my argument.  Part III explains 
Judge Posner’s marked interest in rhetoric and connects that interest 
to his upbringing, his pragmatic theory of judging, and his prefer-
ence for economic rationales.  Part IV explains why Judge Posner’s 
rhetorical strategies make his opinions so attractive to casebook edi-
tors and law professors.  Part V describes three enriching rhetorical 
topics that professors could use to direct law students’ attention to 
Judge Posner’s strategies.  Part V also devotes particular attention to 
 9 See, e.g., THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.  This report was sponsored by 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and is commonly called 
the Carnegie Report.  Id. at 3.  Although the Carnegie Report recommends significant 
changes to other aspects of legal education in U.S. law schools, it characterizes the 
“case dialogue” as the “signature pedagogy” and approves its continuing use at least 
in the first-year curriculum.  Id. at 47–86.  That pedagogy is tied to the use of tradi-
tional casebooks—which is to say it is tied to teaching materials that are usually fo-
cused on legal doctrinal coverage and include modest, if any, attention to judicial bi-
ography, intellectual history, or rhetoric.  I think the Carnegie Report’s analysis of this 
aspect of the first-year curriculum is unfortunately superficial.  But see ELIZABETH 
MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007) 
(documenting and critiquing the classroom dialogues in eight law school courses). 
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some contracts cases that I have taught, but I include examples from 
cases ranging from administrative law, to civil rights, to bankruptcy, 
that illustrate how a relatively basic rhetorical analysis can improve 
students’ understanding of cases in any subject area.  Part VI rounds 
out my initial argument with some general conclusions. 
II. OVERVIEW 
Judge Posner achieved his twenty-fifth anniversary on the bench 
in 2006.  The following year, to honor him, the Harvard Law Review10 
and the University of Chicago Law Review11 dedicated issues to faculty 
comments on his opinions.  Dean Elena Kagan introduces Harvard’s 
issue with this: 
As Judge Posner’s opinions lend themselves to commentary, so 
too do they lend themselves to instruction.  Rifle through the 
pages of whatever casebook you have at hand (nearly any subject, 
common law or statutory, will do) and you will find a grossly dis-
proportionate number of Posner opinions.  Perhaps consciously, 
perhaps not, Judge Posner writes for the casebooks: for two and a 
half decades, he has produced simply remarkable teaching mate-
rials.  Love them, hate them, agree or disagree with them, Judge 
Posner’s opinions make people think—about what the law is do-
ing, about what the law should be doing, about why it all mat-
ters.12 
As Dean Kagan’s introduction reveals, Judge and Professor Richard 
A. Posner has become an “academics’ darling,” to borrow the term he 
used to describe Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his 1990 monograph 
on Justice Cardozo’s reputation.13  In his monograph, Judge Posner 
explained that a judge can build an enduring reputation like Justice 
Cardozo’s, at least in part, by writing opinions that appeal to case-
book editors and law professors.14  The monograph is principally a 
 10 Commentaries: Twenty-Five Years of Richard Posner, the Judge, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1121 (2007). 
 11 Special Issue Commemorating Twenty-Five Years of Judge Richard A. Posner, 74 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1641 (2007). 
 12 Elena Kagan, Commentary, Richard Posner, the Judge, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 
1122 (2007). 
 13 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 91 (1990).  In describing 
Justice Cardozo as “an academics’ darling,” Judge Posner refers to the extraordinary 
number of Justice Cardozo’s opinions in torts and contracts casebooks.  Id. at 90–91. 
 14 Id. at 89–91.  See also Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1388–91; David A. Logan, 
The Man in the Mirror, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1739, 1739–40 (1992) (citing POSNER, supra 
note 13, at vii); David Rosenberg, The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability: 
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 
1221–22 (2007). 
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study of Justice Cardozo’s rhetoric and its effect on building his repu-
tation.15   
This Essay analyzes Judge Posner’s academic audience as much 
as it does his rhetoric.  I argue that Judge Posner’s distinctive rhetori-
cal strategies explain why casebook editors and law professors have af-
forded this living judge such a fulsome reception, and I criticize the 
legal academy nevertheless for focusing almost exclusively on the le-
gal analysis of his opinions rather than on his rhetorical strategies or 
the subtexts they may convey.  Is this a feedback loop in which one of 
the legal academy’s graduates and stellar scholars now supplies it with 
teaching materials?  That would be unremarkable in a graduate dis-
cipline like economics, but it is unusual in legal education.  That may 
not be a bad thing, but it is certainly worth examining.  It is true that 
Judge Posner writes well, but that is often the beginning and the end 
of the rhetorical analysis as we quickly move on to examine his eco-
nomic theories, his pragmatic instrumentalism, or his revision of a 
precedent’s significance.  Given Judge Posner’s reputation as a scho-
lar of economic analysis of law and the economic rationales in his 
opinions, many law professors probably think it inevitable that his 
opinions should appear in their casebooks,16 and surely casebook edi-
[T]he future lies in the minds of students, and I surmise that they are 
the principal audience for Posner’s opinion.  The nature of legal edu-
cation today (and yesterday) is such that students’ exposure to the 
leading functionalist literature—or any scholarly work for that mat-
ter—is usually limited to snippets in casebook notes.  For Posner to get 
more of his message across to students, then, he must do it through his 
opinions, having them published (albeit excerpted) in casebooks and 
his arguments (qua judicial rulings) mooted in class. 
Id. at 1222. 
 15 POSNER, supra note 13, at vii.  The book provides an excellent introduction to 
Judge Posner’s own rhetorical techniques, discussed more infra Part III. 
 16 See Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1391.  By 1995 Judge Posner had climbed to 
the top of the small list of judges whose opinions are frequently anthologized.  As of 
1994 Judge Posner’s contracts opinions appeared in casebooks at an average rate of 
2.46 per casebook.  Id. at 1384–90.  Only Justice Cardozo, with 4.07 per casebook, 
and Judge Roger J. Traynor with 2.62 (both deceased by 1994) surpassed him.  Id.  
The economic analyses in Judge Posner’s opinions, however, are frequently criti-
cized.  See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Eco-
nomic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1141–47 
(2007) (critiquing Judge Posner for failing to account for multiple factors that might 
affect optimal choice-of-law rules); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try This at Home”: 
Posner as Political Economist, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1873, 1878 (2007) (critiquing Judge 
Posner’s concurring opinion in Chicago Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 
741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring)); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic 
Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 1895–96, 1901–09 (2007) (critiquing Judge Posner’s 
“casual empiricism” and challenging the Posnerian claim that economic rationales 
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tors want to signal that their latest edition is au courant17 with what 
Anthony Kronman has described as “the intellectual movement that 
has had the greatest influence on American academic law in the past 
quarter century.”18 
Because opinions can rarely accommodate significant theoretical 
analyses, it might be more accurate to say that opinions in casebooks 
can at most convey an attitude toward the use of economic rationales 
(or any other rationale for that matter) in judging, and that attitude 
is what casebook editors and professors hope to project and perhaps 
to critique.  A more considered reflection on Judge Posner’s success 
in the casebooks provokes some interesting thoughts about why his 
opinions crop up so frequently.  Is it possible that Judge Posner is 
useful and perhaps even reassuring to legal educators because he 
represents an iconic judicial type in the ideology of American lawyer-
ing—the smart, erudite, articulate, witty change-agent?  He revitalizes 
our preferred teaching materials with refreshing craft and, often, new 
meaning.  Some of his opinions are like art; he re-envisions the law,19 
stripping away the accretions of lesser artists, revealing the deep 
structures beneath and recasting conventional wisdom into shiny, 
new forms.  His opinions supply a whiff of interdisciplinary theory 
are less subject to rhetorical manipulation than others; asserting that at least in the 
manner used by the judiciary, “cost-benefit analysis also has potential vices.  It can 
operate as a vessel for unreliable intuitions rather than a way of disciplining them, 
and it can fail to take account of an important aspect of discrimination, consisting of 
the daily humiliations of exclusion and stigmatization.”); Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability 
Versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1912, 1922–31 (2007) 
(critiquing Judge Posner’s analysis in light of “modern economic learning on the 
choice between strict liability and negligence”).  Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster and 
Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1148, 1154, 1157, 1160 (2007) (praising Judge 
Posner for having taken a step in the “right direction” regarding indirect tort liability 
that was frustrated in part by the Supreme Court’s later rationale, and commenting 
with particular relevance to my topic, that “[t]he full potential, and indeed reality, of 
indirect liability as a legal and nonlegal regulatory strategy may have been masked by 
moralistic and legalistic aversions to deviations from the direct liability norm of sanc-
tioning the intuitively primary wrongdoer”). 
 17 Fashions in casebooks no doubt lag behind theory, in part because theory may 
never appear in opinions because the judiciary is constrained by precedent. 
 18 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 166 (1993).  Readers who are interested in pursuing the issues I discuss 
here should find Kronman’s chapter on law schools worth reading, or rereading.  
Among other points, he captures the tension in legal education between the de-
mands of theoretical and interdisciplinary scholarship and the “prudentialist” tradi-
tions associated with examining and teaching the common law.  See id. at 165–270.  
Teaching Judge Posner’s opinions may relieve that tension a bit. 
 19 For a lay parallel and bestseller, see STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, 
FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 
(2005). 
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just when law faculties are most anxious that other university faculties 
view law schools as mere a-theoretical trade schools.  Judge Posner is 
the consummate insider in a conservative profession and a discipline 
that cherishes the occasional irreverent iconoclast.20  He is fresh yet 
familiar.  For all that he has done to influence doctrine and theory, 
he nonetheless validates the century-old law school devotion to teach-
ing appellate opinions. 
It takes two to tango: it takes an author and an audience to cre-
ate a publishing and academic phenomenon.  I suspect Judge Posner 
understands his academic audience better than the audience under-
stands itself.  Judge Posner understands that legal education involves 
immersion in a very select literature of the law, not “the law.”  There is 
a canon, and within the canon at any given time the most entertain-
ing and accessible writers will be most influential.  Judge Posner has 
deliberately and self-consciously created a body of didactic literature 
in his opinions—a canon update, if you will.  There’s no law against 
that.  If this phenomenon seems to threaten some separation of pow-
ers between academia and the judiciary,21 the casebook editors and 
professors must be responsible for buying the goods.  Nobody is re-
quired to teach Judge Posner’s opinions. 
But enough about the faculty!  What about the students?  What-
ever impact Judge Posner may ultimately have on legal doctrine and 
theory, his substantial presence in the casebooks is bound to impress 
several generations of lawyers.  Judge Posner’s enduring significance 
may be in what his opinions—with the law schools’ help—teach new 
lawyers about the law, about values, and about the use of rhetoric.22 
 20 I deliberately treat Judge Posner simultaneously as an icon and as an icono-
clast.  Persuasive iconoclasts, unlike merely overpowering ones, are endowed with 
some credibility. 
 21 See POSNER, supra note 13, at 133 (The criteria of academic excellence and ju-
dicial effectiveness are not co-extensive: “Then, too, the audience for judicial opin-
ions is not primarily an academic one. . . .  [T]he judge who wants to be effective is 
constrained for the most part to operate incrementally, respecting distinctions, pre-
cedents, traditions, and whatnot that make the professor justifiably impatient.”). 
 22 Rhetorical analysis considers much more than style.  See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF RHETORIC (Thomas O. Sloane ed., 2001).  Judge Posner’s style and other rhetori-
cal characteristics deserve more scholarly attention than they have yet received.  
Judge Posner may be the leading authority on his own rhetorical strategies.  See Rich-
ard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 
(1995).  The aforementioned article appears within an issue devoted almost entirely 
to judicial opinion writing.  Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1363 
(1995). 
Readers interested generally in judicial rhetoric may find two recent works 
worthwhile.  Judicial opinions’ content, style, and legal significance in the Anglo-
American tradition have varied significantly over time.  For a fascinating argument 
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In Part V, I consider three rhetorical strategies Judge Posner 
commonly uses: citation of seminal authorities, distinctive organiza-
tional techniques, and colloquial style.  Judge Posner’s style—
colloquial word choice, occasional sentence fragments, and so 
forth—probably attracts the most attention and makes most of his 
opinions instantly recognizable to experienced readers.  The impact 
is heightened if an opinion is read in isolation or mixed in with opin-
ions by other judges.  The impact of Judge Posner’s distinctive style is 
diluted, however, if one reads a number of his opinions together.  
Then one can see that this prolific writer efficiently reuses some 
techniques and that his opinions reveal remarkable stylistic consis-
tency.  Nevertheless, style alone does not account for his opinions’ 
popularity as teaching vehicles. 
To most students, Judge Posner’s writing must sparkle with clar-
ity and modernity, at least in comparison to most of the assigned 
reading.  Here are two examples, the first from a very recent case and 
the second from a case that has been the subject of substantial doc-
trinal critique that is discussed in more detail below. 
(1) “Constructive trust” is legalese for seeking to wrest ownership 
of a thing from its nominal owner, which is to say the holder of 
legal title.  It is not a real trust; in law, “constructive” often and 
here means “fictional.”23 
and 
(2) If you extract a promise by means of a threat, the promise is 
unenforceable.  That is not, as so often stated because such a 
promise is involuntary unless “involuntary” is a conclusion rather 
than the description of a mental state.  If the threat is ferocious 
(“your money or your life”) and believed, the victim may be des-
perately eager to fend it off with a promise.  Such promises are 
made unenforceable in order to discourage threats by making 
them less profitable.  The fundamental issue in a duress case is 
therefore not the victim’s state of mind but whether the statement 
that opinions were once, and could become again, distinct from the precedential 
significance of the judgment, see Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1226–27, 1273 (2007).  For an interesting hypothesis that 
Judge Posner’s ability to use informal organizational structures and colloquial lan-
guage while maintaining an authoritative tone is due to the current security, stability, 
and power of the federal courts, see WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL 
OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 108–26 (2007). 
 23 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 
2007) (Posner, J.). 
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that induced the promise is the kind of offer to deal that we want 
to discourage, and hence that we call a “threat.”24 
Just these two examples contain good, practical lessons about writing 
well for the audience if professors would draw students’ attention to 
the short sentences and frank, funny, anti-legalese of the first and the 
colloquial wording and vivid examples of the second.25 
But in addition to pointing out these examples of craft—
whether or not one likes them—professors could also call students’ 
attention to the possibility that, like many a great writer, Judge Pos-
ner’s writing reflects and conveys some implicit messages.  In particu-
lar, as I discuss in the next section, Judge Posner’s distinctive rhetori-
cal strategies may arise from a more or less conscious effort to 
distance his analysis, by using rhetoric, from some troublesome for-
bearers, especially his mother and Justice Cardozo.26  While the con-
tent of his economic and judging theories, his logic, and his use of 
empirical and legal authority are all hotly contested in legal scholar-
ship, and faculty presumably share some of these critiques with stu-
dents, students will hear little of how Judge Posner’s views may have 
been shaped by his time, place, and circumstances and will not un-
derstand these influences unless their professors tell them.27  I am 
quite sure that few professors devote precious classroom minutes to 
deconstructing the rhetorical techniques Judge Posner uses to ad-
vance his ideas and attitudes, and little can be discerned from the ca-
sebooks.  Perhaps Judge Posner’s distortions and omissions of prece-
dent might make it into the typical, doctrinally busy law school 
 24 Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(Posner, J.). 
 25 Would it be possible to devote some of the legal writing curriculum to close 
analysis of Judge Posner’s rhetorical strategies?  Could one teach legal method by as-
signing students the task of writing opinions in his style and then again in the style of 
a judge with a different philosophy—perhaps Judge Patricia Wald of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit?  Compare Posner, supra note 22, at 1440–
43, with Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writ-
ings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1375–80 (1995) [hereinafter Rhetoric of Results] and Pa-
tricia M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1451, 1452 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Reply to Judge Posner] (Judge Wald objects, among other things, to Judge Posner’s 
manners in criticizing one of her opinions without having provided advanced warn-
ing: “Wow! What has happened to the vaunted Seventh Circuit civility?  An out-of-
town guest is invited to sup at the master’s table, only to find she is the main 
course.”). 
 26 See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY 10 (1973) 
(explaining the literary theory that each new poet must supplant his predecessors). 
 27 See MERTZ, supra note 9, at 75–79 (describing the contrast in the classroom dia-
logue between the professor’s insistence on precise dissection of doctrine and toler-
ance of airy policy discussions). 
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classroom, but even that may be unlikely because students would have 
to have read the precedents and they do not have time.  Judge Posner 
is free—enabled by academics—to play the daring free-thinker, to re-
state the literature of the law in his own vivid and persuasive terms, 
while he is presented in casebooks as just one more work-a-day jurist. 
I suspect Judge Posner has and will continue to have quite an 
impact on students’ attitudes and expressive tones, and especially on 
their sense of what it means to be an elite legal professional.  Most 
students are ill-equipped by prior education to detect subtexts.  If 
professors do not draw students’ attention to these subtexts, I do not 
see how students can do anything but accept the apparent approba-
tion from the unusual frequency of his opinions.  The way a judicial 
icon writes his way into academic iconicity is an important lesson, at 
least as long as law schools teach principally with appellate opinions. 
In the balance of this Essay, I will suggest some of the implicit 
messages conveyed by our fondness for teaching this erudite, under-
standable, and coolly persuasive judicial writer.  By attending to what 
seems natural, but has been carefully constructed, I hope to illumi-
nate some dimly perceived aspects of our academic culture.  A peda-
gogy that fails to contextualize an intellect like Judge Posner’s and to 
attend to his rhetorical skills is undertheorized.  To that end, in the 
next Part, I will describe a little of Judge Posner’s personal back-
ground with the goal of explaining why he might be particularly in-
terested in altering some inherited rhetorical conventions of the legal 
profession on his way to changing minds. 
III. WHY RHETORIC INTERESTS JUDGE POSNER 
Judge Posner has long acknowledged that appellate judges have 
considerable, but not unlimited, discretion in interpreting and apply-
ing the law.28  He also thinks that a skilled writer may be able to per-
suade audiences to believe what they might not otherwise believe.29  
The combination means that a judge, who is a skilled writer, may per-
suade himself and other judges, lawyers, and the public, that a deci-
sion is wise despite not having very good reasons for it.30  Judge Pos-
ner seems to believe that economic reasons, however, can curb a 
judge’s ability to be confused by his own rhetoric: 
There is a broad area in which judges can properly bring econom-
ics to bear on law, but they cannot make it the sole guide to their 
 28 E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Case Against Strict Constructionism: What Am I?  A 
Potted Plant?, THE NEW REPUBLIC 23 (Sept. 18, 1987). 
 29 See infra note 46. 
 30 See infra pp 117–21 and accompanying notes. 
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job; more important, the language of economics will not conceal 
from them what they are doing when they use economics to make 
or change the law.31 
Others have observed, however, that the use of economic analy-
sis is itself a rhetorical strategy so that Judge Posner’s hope that eco-
nomic analysis may restrain the excesses of judicial discretion and 
rhetorical prowess may be in vain: 
The whole of normative law and economics is to that extent 
shaped by an ideal of clarity in moral argument, and by a confi-
dence in the resolving power of certain methodical techniques, 
that are antithetical to the prudentialist tradition and to the 
claims of practical wisdom.  The claim that there is no clean-
edged method for resolving moral disputes and that many ques-
tions of this kind have no principled answer at all has its roots in 
the experience of incommensurability as a fact of moral life.  It is 
the phenomenon of incommensurability that most forcefully sug-
gests the need for practical wisdom in deliberation, and that 
compels us to ask what prudence is.  But the phenomenon of in-
commensurability is invisible from an economic point of view.  
For the assertion that all moral controversies can be resolved by 
applying to them the single standard of efficiency (whatever the 
philosophical justification for doing so may be) implies that real 
incommensurabilities do not exist and, where they seem to, 
should be treated as illusions that clear thinking will dissolve.32 
 31 POSNER, supra note 1, at 314.   
 32 KRONMAN, supra note 18, at 237–38.  For an interesting and informative intel-
lectual history and an argument that “law and economics” is but an instance of a per-
sistent preference since the Enlightenment for scientific ways of knowing and reason-
ing in Anglo-American legal culture, see generally JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER 
COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR 
OBJECTIVITY (2007).  Hackney discusses Judge Posner at some length, emphasizing 
his role as a “popularizer” of economic analysis in law and arguing that Judge Posner 
has evolved from an economic formalist to a pragmatist.  Id. at 108–71, 209–10 n.132.  
For a critique of Judge Posner’s preference for the methodology of economics by a 
leading pragmatist, see RICHARD RORTY, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Jus-
tice, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 93 (1999), and RICHARD RORTY, Pragmatism and 
Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 104 (1999).  See also Brian Leiter, Science and 
Morality: Pragmatic Reflections on Rorty’s “Pragmatism”, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2007); 
Martha Nussbaum, On Moral Progress: A Response to Richard Rorty, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
939 (2007); Richard Rorty, Dewey and Posner on Pragmatism and Moral Progress, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 915 (2007).  For two different approaches to Judge Posner’s views on 
economic analysis and pragmatism, see Martha Minow, Religion and the Burden of 
Proof: Posner’s Economics and Pragmastism in Metzle v. Leininger, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1175 (2007), and Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the 
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 384–
428 (1985).  For Judge Posner’s own views on pragmatism, economic analysis, and 
morals, see POSNER, supra note 8; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL 
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Posner’s intriguing monograph on Cardozo considers the effect 
of persuasive rhetoric on judicial opinions and on judges’ reputa-
tions, and it reveals as much about its author as its subject.33  I will use 
this book, together with a few published bits of biographical informa-
tion about Posner’s childhood,34 to explain an intuition. 
The intuition is this: I think Judge Posner’s suspicion of “moral-
ism” and moralistic rhetoric predates his devotion to arguments 
based on economic instrumentalism.  The suspicion may actually 
drive him to the economic arguments.  This is the reverse of what 
some critics say—his devotion to economic efficiency arguments 
makes him discount other values.35  I suspect it was the persistent mo-
ralistic rhetoric of his mother, and people he associates with her 
views, that sent him to the market.  That is not such a remarkable in-
sight.  After all, many people of Judge Posner’s generation—growing 
up in the 1940s and 1950s, mature and educated before the late 
1960s—thought the Soviet Union a horrible oppressor and became 
skeptical about the costs and the efficacy of domestic social uplift 
agendas.  That the economic theories associated with the Chicago 
School from the 1950s through the 1980s should have offered Judge 
Posner an intellectual haven is hardly surprising.  Judge Posner is re-
markable not for the novelty of his ideology but for his intelligence, 
his rhetorical skills, and his contribution to transplanting economics 
into law.  To understand that, students need some exposure to bio-
graphical, intellectual, and social history, which doctrinal casebooks 
do not impart. 
Judge Posner came of age during the Cold War.  From Judge 
Posner himself, we have a little information that he came to regard 
his parents’ socialism or communism, especially his mother’s, as sog-
gy sentimentality.36  Not just soggy, but stupid, dangerous, perhaps 
AND LEGAL THEORY (1999) [hereinafter PROBLEMATICS]; and RICHARD A. POSNER, So 
What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law, in OVERCOMING LAW 388 (1995). 
 33 See generally POSNER, supra note 13.  Others have noticed this intersection of au-
thor and subject.  See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1380; Logan, supra note 14, 
at 1739. 
 34 Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner: An Interview with Richard Posner, NEW 
YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 78. 
 35 See generally RORTY, supra note 32; Nussbaum, supra note 32; Cunningham, su-
pra note 5, at 1409 (arguing that Judge Posner turns Justice Cardozo’s moralistic un-
derstanding of good faith in contract performance “upside down”). 
 36 MacFarquhar writes: 
When Posner grew more conservative (he thought of himself as a lib-
eral until he was thirty or so), his mother was horrified.  “We had terri-
ble fights,” he says.  “I became really furious at her.  See, she was one of 
these bright fools, my mother—quite a bright person, but very limited.  
The other thing that annoyed me about her was that I worried about 
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even murderous, sentimentality.37  Like many in his generation, he 
came to deplore those fellow travelers who failed to perceive the So-
viet Union’s brutal oppression of its own subjects, and who persisted 
without any empirical support even in the face of much empirical 
contradiction, in thinking that a communist ideology, or some vari-
ant, represented hope for the poor and downtrodden, rather than 
the greatest threat to western, individual liberties in the twentieth 
century after the Third Reich.  The economic expansion of the Unit-
ed States after the Second World War and the eventual collapse of 
the Soviet Union seemed to validate the superiority of the U.S. politi-
cal economy—if it could be preserved from blinkered do-gooders.38 
her politics interfering with my career.  Every time I got a government 
job, I always felt obligated to tell the authorities that I had this mother 
who had probably been a Communist.  It was an annoying piece of 
baggage.  Then eventually she became senile and forgot about politics 
and actually became very benign.  Both [my wife] Charlene and I 
breathed a sigh of relief.”  Looking back on his red-diaper childhood, 
Posner considers his parents hypocrites. “It was just talk,” he says of 
their radicalism.  “They wanted me to live the same conventional life 
that they lived.” 
. . . . 
     “I don’t know if this is true of everybody,” Posner says, “but I loved 
my parents when I was growing up and they were really the sort of par-
ents you should be grateful to—my mother gave me great cultural en-
richment, and my father helped me buy our first house, so they were 
ideal parents.” 
. . . . 
     Martha Nussbaum, a philosopher at the University of Chicago and a 
friend of Posner’s, believes that his upbringing and his pious, Commu-
nist mother are the reason that he is now repelled by moralism of any 
kind, and takes refuge in literature.  He loves scandalous, immoralist 
writers such as Stendhal and Gide, and indeed, the world of French 
novels is in many ways more congenial to Posner’s caustic tempera-
ment, and to an economic, self-interested view of human nature, than 
that of the law. 
MacFarquhar, supra note 34, at 83–84. 
 37 MacFarquhar reports a family history that seems loaded with possible tensions 
about issues of morality, justice, law, politics, and finances. 
His mother was a Communist and was friendly with the family that 
adopted the Rosenberg children.  The day Stalin died was a day of 
mourning in the Posner household.  His father had a checkered ca-
reer: as a young man, he worked in a jewelry business with some cous-
ins; then, having attended law school at night, he became a criminal-
defense lawyer.  After the Second World War, he became a money-
lender, specializing in second mortgages in New York slums; he was so 
successful at this that he bought a Cadillac and, in 1948, moved his 
family to Scarsdale. 
Id. at 83. 
 38 For a collection of essays on major cultural figures of the twentieth century 
that reflects this post-WWII zeitgeist within certain circles in the western “liberal de-
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The underlying issues here are not trivial, and they have bedev-
iled jurisprudence since the realists poked holes in legal actors’ 
claims to objectivity and since H.L.A. Hart’s positivism39 took a body 
blow from the Third Reich.40  One could argue that both Hitler’s 
Third Reich and Stalin’s Soviet Union owed a good deal of their 
powers to the abuse of reason and morality through rhetoric.41 
It would be a small step to conclude that rhetoric is the problem, 
and that sentimentality—which can be hard to distinguish from mor-
alism—clothed in rhetoric is an even bigger problem.  As a juvenile, 
Judge Posner might have elided his mother’s politics with her gift to 
him of a love of literature.42  Perhaps as a result, his early love of lit-
erature, with all the attendant lessons about the power of rhetoric 
and remarkable rhetorical gifts seemed to pose some danger that 
might need to be controlled.43  Students of literature understand that 
rhetoric and authorial bias are inescapable.  Add power to the mix, 
and you have a potentially serious danger.  Judge Posner—the adult 
jurisprude—understands this.  In an exercise of self-control he might 
have decided, consciously or not, to direct his very considerable rhe-
torical skills toward goals whose attainment could be quantified and 
assessed objectively, at least in theory.  It could not have hurt that the 
United States was triumphant both militarily and economically, and 
that a good deal of intellectual fire power was directed toward ex-
plaining why and how the successes could be improved upon.  There-
fore, Judge Posner might have found a solution to rhetorical anxiety 
in economic methodology. 
Judge Posner seems both intrigued and disturbed by what the 
study of literature taught him about the power of rhetoric to make 
people do and believe things that they might not otherwise do or be-
mocracies,” see CLIVE JAMES, CULTURAL AMNESIA: NECESSARY MEMORIES FROM HISTORY 
AND THE ARTS (2007). 
 39 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). 
 40 See POSNER, supra note 8, at 228–39. 
 41 See, e.g., RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND 
LITERATURE 127–87 (1992) (including a discussion of the Nazis’ use of legalistic rhe-
toric to abuse Jewish people and others). 
 42 POSNER, supra note 1, at v. (“For my mother, who initiated me into the pleas-
ures of literature, and my father, who encouraged me to go to law school.”). 
 43 MacFarquhar, supra note 34, at 86 (reporting that Judge Posner studied Eng-
lish at Yale with Cleanth Brooks, a noted scholar associated with the New Criticism 
movement, and that Judge Posner was attracted to Nietzsche for the view that “a per-
son is responsible for his own life” and that “we have no right to blame anyone else 
for the result because it was ours to make or muff”).  I speculate on the relevance of 
New Criticism to Judge Posner’s approach to legal education in the final part of this 
Essay. 
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lieve.44  For example, in Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, 
he devotes a chapter to the Judicial Opinion as Literature.45  In that 
chapter, he pays particular attention to the Yeats poem, “The Second 
Coming,” and examines how Yeats seems to produce an attitude or 
belief in readers that is not borne out by the literal meaning of the 
words written.46  Judge Posner goes on to examine the funeral 
speeches by Brutus and Antony in Act III of Shakespeare’s Julius Cae-
 44 All literature employs rhetoric, and rhetoric may be literary, but not necessar-
ily.  Both words have a broad range of meanings.  In this context, by “literature” 
Judge Posner and I are referring to the broad category of literature that is “imagina-
tive or creative writing, especially of recognized artistic value” and to the narrower 
category of professional or disciplinary literature comprised of judicial opinions.  
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1050 (3d ed. 1992).  
“Rhetoric” is the “art or study of using language effectively and persuasively.”  Id. at 
1547.  This dictionary contains a pertinent usage note: 
The word rhetoric was once primarily the name of an important branch 
of philosophy and an art deserving of serious study.  In recent years the 
word has come to be used chiefly in a pejorative sense to refer to in-
flated language and pomposity.  Deprecation of the term may result 
from a modern linguistic Puritanism, which holds that language used 
in legitimate persuasion should be plain and free of artifice—itself a 
tendentious rhetorical doctrine, though not often recognized as such.  
But many writers still prefer to bear in mind the traditional meanings 
of the word.  Thus, according to the newer use of the term, the phrase 
empty rhetoric, as in The politicians talk about solutions, but they usually offer 
only empty rhetoric, might be construed as redundant.  But in fact only 35 
percent of the Usage Panel judged this example to be redundant.  Pre-
sumably, it can be maintained that rhetoric can be other than empty. 
Id.  This usage note is reminiscent of the contest between Barack Obama and Hillary 
Clinton for the Democratic presidential nomination in which the question of wheth-
er Obama’s oratorical eloquence indicated his capacity for leadership or was merely 
“empty rhetoric.” 
 45 POSNER, supra note 1, at 269–316. 
 46 Id. at 275–76.  Judge Posner writes, 
How can a writer persuade, without an effort at logical or empirical 
proof?  The answer is that in areas of uncertainty, areas not yet con-
quered by logic or science, we are open to persuasion by all sorts of 
methods, some remote from logic and science.  It is not that people are 
irrational; it is that when unable to obtain direct confirmation of an as-
sertion they do not just suspend judgment—they seek indirect confir-
mation or refutation. 
Id.  In light of this comment, it is interesting to read Richard Rorty’s argument that 
Judge Posner has rejected “the idea that we have made moral progress” and that this 
rejection is “a relapse from the true pragmatist faith into positivistic science-worship.”  
Rorty, supra note 32, at 918–19 (discussing POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 32, at 
4–6).  See also Nussbaum, supra note 32, at 939 (agreeing “with Rorty against Posner” 
that there is moral progress).  But see Leiter, supra note 32, at 929 (disputing Rorty’s 
view of pragmatism).  For a historical account of the role of scientific positivism in 
Anglo-American legal theory, see HACKNEY, JR., supra note 32, at 27–28, 35–51, 94–
100. 
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sar.47  He contrasts how Brutus’s honest but elegantly detached ora-
tion fails to persuade the Roman mob, while Antony’s does, despite 
the fact that “almost everything in this passage is false.”48  Judge Pos-
ner comments that “[n]ot for nothing has Antony’s speech been 
called ‘an exhibition of the destruction of reason by rhetoric.’”49  An-
tony “uses emotion rather than reason to make his case.”50 
These concerns inform Judge Posner’s monograph on Justice 
Cardozo.  Judge Posner argues that the principal cause of Justice 
Cardozo’s judicial reputation was his combination of rhetorical prow-
ess and pragmatism.51  Before Judge Posner gets to the details, he of-
fers a summary of Justice Cardozo’s life that is quite intriguing for 
what it might tell us about the particular rhetorical strategies Judge 
Posner uses to promote a non-moralistic, economic variation on Jus-
tice Cardozo’s pragmatism.52 
After noting that “psychobiography is a controversial genre, and 
efforts at judicial psychobiography . . . have not been well received,”53 
Judge Posner first repeats speculation that Justice Cardozo set about 
creating an aura of personal “saintliness” to escape the taint of a cor-
ruption scandal that brought down his father’s legal career.54  Then 
he writes this fascinating paragraph: 
Scholars of psychiatric bent might, however, want to explore the 
possible significance of the fact that Cardozo’s mother died when 
he was a child and his father when Cardozo was an adolescent, 
and that Cardozo’s twin was a girl.  “Patients growing up in fami-
lies where one or both of the parents died appear more compro-
mised in their interpersonal relationships . . . .  These patients are 
more likely to have impairments in achieving stable, mature adult 
attachments.”  Cardozo’s relationship with Nell [his elder sister], 
and his (quite possibly related) failure to marry, is consistent with 
this observation.  As for having a twin of the opposite sex, it has 
been suggested that this can result in the “feminizing” of the male 
twin and the “masculinizing” of the female.  This suggestion 
might, if true, help explain Cardozo’s failure to marry.  Yet his 
twin was his only sibling to marry!  I shall not pursue these ques-
tions further; the details of Cardozo’s psychology, so far as they 
 47 POSNER, supra note 1, at 278–81. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 281 (citing NICHOLAS BROOKE, SHAKESPEARE’S EARLY TRAGEDIES 157 
(1968)). 
 50 Id. 
 51 POSNER, supra note 13, at 126–28. 
 52 Id. at 1–19. 
 53 Id. at 5 n.10. 
 54 Id. at 5, 8. 
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are known, seem tenuously, if at all, related to his professional 
work, which is my interest.55 
Then why raise these questions in the first place?  Judge Posner is too 
skilled a writer to have wandered off topic by accident.  Instead, the 
last sentence is a prolepsis—a rhetorical device for rebutting an ar-
gument before it is even raised.56  But what would that argument be?  
I see three possibilities. 
One might question the evidence for Judge Posner’s speculation 
about the feminizing effects of Justice Cardozo’s youthful family cir-
cumstances.  Judge Posner cites only two references.57  The second 
might question Judge Posner’s implicit message about normal gen-
dered behavior: Judge Posner suggests that these feminizing influ-
ences resulted in Justice Cardozo’s failure to marry.  The next para-
graph notes that Justice Cardozo was “exceedingly polite,” and points 
to a particular sign of his politeness in that “he rarely adopted an ad-
versarial stance toward lawyers or lower-court judges, either in person 
or in his opinions. . . .  Of course he lived in an era when lawyers and 
 55 Id. at 6 (citations omitted). 
 56 The prolepsis shelters Judge Posner’s implicit attitudes about normal matura-
tion from challenge by declaring the paragraph irrelevant and thereby deflecting all 
but the most intrepid readers from considering it further.  I note it here for two rea-
sons.  First, since Judge Posner often writes more than is strictly necessary for resolu-
tion of an appeal, he sometimes uses a form of prolepsis to indicate his awareness.  
For an example in a recent opinion of Judge Posner’s use of prolepsis to shelter dic-
ta, see Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 808 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
“this is another issue to be considered in the first instance on remand, should its res-
olution become critical to the outcome”).  The Seventh Circuit reversed the district 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim prior to discovery for lack of standing and 
remanded the case.  Much of Judge Posner’s opinion was directed to the merits if 
certain facts could be proven.  Id. at 800–08.  Judge Ripple concurred in the decision 
but objected to this “commentary on the merits at this time.”  Id. at 808 (Ripple, J., 
concurring).  A frank statement that an analysis is dicta can make space for a useful 
discussion without confusing lower courts and practitioners.  For an interesting dis-
cussion about the appropriate and inappropriate use of dicta by the United States 
Supreme Court, see Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006). 
Second, I dwell on this “aside” about Justice Cardozo’s elective and gendered af-
finities because I do not think the prolepsis is literally true.  Instead, I think the pa-
ragraph raises issues that may interest Judge Posner quite a bit.  One might be 
whether a person without stable, mature, adult attachments would be more or less 
likely to build a considerable reputation.  Another might be whether such a person 
might be inclined (perhaps out of necessity or insecurity) to be more than usually 
polite to acquaintances.  Perhaps this paragraph implies that Justice Cardozo’s re-
markable kindliness may have been the product of imperfect maturation.  If so, then 
an unwitting reader, indulging in a sloppy negative inference, might infer that a 
judge and scholar like Judge Posner, who seems to engage in a fair amount of adver-
sarial behavior on and off the bench, is exhibiting a fully mature personality. 
 57 POSNER, supra note 13, at 6. 
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judges—perhaps people in general—were more civil than they are 
today.”58  A third might accuse Judge Posner of concealing a stealthy 
put-down of his subject—and rival for judicial reputation—in a 
breezy, faintly gossipy, summary of his subject’s early years.  On first 
impression, Judge Posner appears to be impugning Justice Cardozo’s 
masculinity while coyly avoiding any explicit endorsement of the 
gender stereotypes his writing employs.  Upon reflection, however, I 
doubt that Judge Posner cares about Justice Cardozo’s masculinity.  
Instead, he is up to a subtler business: I think the above quoted para-
graph is designed to imply that Justice Cardozo was not fully devel-
oped in some way.  The significance of such an arrested development 
emerges later. 
Far from being off topic, Judge Posner is laying the groundwork 
for a distinction—that Judge Posner does not suffer from an arrested 
development.  Despite some similarities in rhetorical prowess, Judge 
Posner is not to be lumped with Justice Cardozo.  His theory of judg-
ing, unlike Justice Cardozo’s, is fully developed. 
By calling attention to Justice Cardozo’s rhetorical skills a little 
later in the book,59 Judge Posner could have put himself in a tight 
spot had he not laid the groundwork for this distinction.  Like Justice 
Cardozo, he is a skilled judicial rhetorician.  Like Justice Cardozo, he 
claims to be a pragmatist, unwilling to pretend that judicial decisions 
are dictated by application of determinate principles.  Like Justice 
Cardozo, he has acquired a reputation based in large measure on his 
ability to write opinions that garner readers, especially academic 
readers.  If Judge Posner is not to concede that his opinions are in-
teresting or powerful merely because of his rhetorical gifts, and if he 
is to avoid the implication that his own judicial reputation may rest 
upon literary talents and not on substantive merit, he must distinguish 
himself from Justice Cardozo.  Here, I think, is the point of the psy-
chobiography paragraph.  Unlike some critics, Judge Posner does not 
fault Justice Cardozo’s rhetoric for being too flowery and meta-
phoric—that is, too rhetorical.  He could not do so in good conscience 
because, as we shall see, he is an equally deliberate author.  Nor does 
he fault Justice Cardozo for pragmatism or for manipulating prece-
dent to wriggle free of formalist constraints—he too is a pragmatic in-
strumentalist more interested in achieving outcomes than in adher-
ing to precedent for its own sake. 
 58 Id. at 6–7. 
 59 Id. at 47. 
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Instead, he criticizes Justice Cardozo’s opinions for a substantive 
deficiency.60  In discussing Justice Cardozo’s famous opinion in Hynes 
v. New York Central Railroad,61 Judge Posner says that “[n]o reason is 
given for the conclusion. . . .  In his soaring peroration Cardozo has 
given no reason why the plaintiff should win.  Again it is Cardozo the 
rhetorician, rather than Cardozo the pragmatic policy analyst, the so-
ciological jurisprude, whose hand is visible.”62  Judge Posner com-
ments that 
neither in Hynes nor elsewhere in Cardozo’s corpus are these 
fundamental principles set forth or the ends of law specified.  
Cardozo is committed to a pragmatic approach that he frequently 
is unable to make operational so that its application can be pre-
dicted.  He may have had in mind as the shaping principle of law 
nothing more exciting than public opinion. . . .63  If weak on pol-
icy analysis, Hynes is strong on rhetoric (no thanks to the plain-
tiff’s sixty-six-page brief, with its seventeen separate argument 
headings).  But as the term embraces all verbal methods of per-
suasion, including the emotive and the deceitful, the normative 
implications of “powerful rhetoric” are equivocal.64 
Judge Posner is working here to differentiate his own approach to 
opinion-writing, trying to preserve the credibility of self-conscious lit-
erary techniques to enhance the effectiveness of judicial opinions, 
while dealing with the criticism that the judge who uses such tech-
niques may only be enacting his own intuitions under camouflage.  
He comments on another famous Justice Cardozo opinion:65 
Palsgraf’s celebrity is due in part . . . to Cardozo’s technique.  And 
that technique is quintessentially rhetorical in a sense that cannot 
be taken as wholly complimentary in evaluating a judicial opinion, 
for one element of the technique is the selection of facts with a 
freedom bordering on that of a novelist or a short-story writer, 
and another is outright fictionalizing (“at the other end of the 
platform, many feet away”).  Moreover, despite Cardozo’s pro-
fessed (and, so far as I am able to determine, sincere) pragma-
tism, his opinion does not come to grips with the issues of policy 
that are raised by the problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff, and 
 60 Id. at 38–41. 
 61 Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921). 
 62 POSNER, supra note 13, at 53. 
 63 It is not clear why deference to public opinion is necessarily inappropriate in a 
case where the law is indeterminate.  Perhaps Judge Posner thinks such deference is 
symptomatic of a failure to fully develop, as in modern adolescents’ alleged concern 
with what people think of them. 
 64 POSNER, supra note 13, at 53–54. 
 65 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 12 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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more broadly of the extremely unlikely accident.  Indeed, one of 
the rhetorical skills deployed in the opinions is that of avoiding 
practical considerations while sounding practical . . . .  To see how 
ordinary a case Palsgraf would have been in the hands of an ordi-
nary judge, one has only to read the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in the intermediate appellate court.  Cardozo could make 
silk purses out of sow’s ears—a gift vouchsafed to few judges.66 
Judge Posner understands that Justice Cardozo was able to hasten 
changes in the common law by cloaking his opinions in rhetorical 
appeals to unarticulated, undertheorized values.  Justice Cardozo be-
came the “academics’ darling,” perhaps because of his impact on the 
development of law, but certainly because his rhetorical skills made 
his opinions interesting to read and gave academics something to 
analyze and to teach, regardless of their evaluation of substantive me-
rits.67  This is a subtle but important point.   
 Judge Posner is not really disturbed by the outcome of Justice 
Cardozo’s decisions.  He admires Justice Cardozo’s conscious prag-
matism, and he has no use for the inherited formalism of some of 
Justice Cardozo’s contemporaries—a formalism that Justice Cardozo 
helped relegate to the judicial back burner at least for a time.  Judge 
Posner may be bothered that a great judicial writer could achieve 
such results—and such a reputation—by skillfully presenting the 
wrong or inadequate reasons for decent decisions and by skillfully 
appealing to the moralizing instincts in his readers to support out-
comes he thought desirable.  I think the point may be to stake out a 
position for writing opinions in such a manner as to ensure their 
popularity with academic lawyers while maintaining a claim to supra-
rhetorical soundness. 
Judge Posner has argued that because values and morals are va-
riable and often highly contested within a given society—and cer-
tainly among different societies—they cannot provide an objective 
basis for concluding that one society is more “moral” than another.68  
Only science (in the sense of empirical investigation of phenomena) 
is able to produce considerable consensus—agreement that a hy-
pothesis is borne out by repeated observations of measurable phe-
nomena.  To that extent, Judge Posner suggests that science has 
made more progress than morals.69  Further, he argues that there is 
no objective basis by which one can assess moral arguments: “At its 
 66 POSNER, supra note 13, at 46–47. 
 67 Id. at 91. 
 68 POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 32, at 6. 
 69 Id. at 18; see Rorty, supra note 32, at 920–21. 
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best, moral philosophy, like literature, enriches; it neither proves nor 
edifies.”70  Judge Posner claims that “[m]oral entrepreneurs per-
suade, but not with rational arguments.”  They use “techniques of 
nonrational persuasion.”71  And, of course, he has spent much of his 
professional life arguing that economic analyses of the effects of legal 
decisions on costs and benefits, among other factors, are more objec-
tive.  As Richard Rorty commented, 
Posner’s refusal to admit that we have made moral progress is a 
rhetorical gesture that can have no bearing on practice.  For mor-
al progress is not an idea we can possibly get out of our heads.  
Only the lingering influence of science-worship tempts us to try.  
The positivists agreed with Plato that to have knowledge was to see 
things under the aspect of eternity, and they then argued that on-
ly natural science could do that.  But if we can bring ourselves to 
give up that Platonic view of knowledge, we might become willing 
to admit that doubts about moral progress are as phony as doubts 
about the reality of electrons.  Once Plato’s attempt to escape 
from time to eternity is abandoned, we are left with nothing but 
the hope that we will look good to our future selves, and to future 
generations.  Dewey thought that hope was enough.72 
Judge Posner devotes the rest of the monograph to discussing the 
bases of Justice Cardozo’s “eminence.”  Those are first, the rhetoric of 
his opinions, and second, his pragmatist agenda.73  “An important 
part of Cardozo’s rhetorical skill was his ability to sugarcoat the 
pragmatist pill . . . so that not only his judicial colleagues but the en-
tire legal establishment accepted him as a consummate insider rather 
than fearing him as a bomb-throwing radical.”74  Judge Posner does 
not attribute Justice Cardozo’s reputation to analytic brilliance or to a 
substantial impact on the law.75  Justice Cardozo’s accomplishment on 
the New York Court of Appeals “was not to persuade his colleagues to 
change their principles (a task beyond the persuasive power of any 
judge), but to persuade them to give rein to those principles.  He 
showed them how to write professionally respectable opinions chang-
ing the law in the direction they and he desired.”76 
In describing the reputable characteristics of Justice Cardozo’s 
judicial opinions, Judge Posner could be describing some of his own: 
 70 POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 32, at 32. 
 71 Id. at ix, 42. 
 72 Rorty, supra note 32, at 927. 
 73 POSNER, supra note 13, at 126–27, 132. 
 74 Id. at 127–28. 
 75 Id. at 126. 
 76 Id. at 131. 
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[W]hat we can expect, and what we find in abundance in Car-
dozo’s opinions, are (1) a vivid, even dramatic, bodying forth of 
the judge’s concerns, (2) a lucid presentation of arresting particu-
lars—fodder for academic analysis, (3) a sense of the relatedness 
of these particulars to larger themes, (4) a point of view that tran-
scends the litigants’ parochial concerns (for Cardozo it was his 
pragmatist program), (5) a power of clear and forceful statement, 
and (6) a high degree of sensitivity to the expectations of one’s 
audience.  Anyone conversant with literature will recognize these 
as virtues commonly associated with works of imaginative litera-
ture and therefore rhetorical.77 
     Pursuing the literary analogy we may say that a prime virtue of 
a judicial opinion is wit in the eighteenth-century sense of what 
oft was thought but ne’er so well expressed.  None of the themes 
in Cardozo’s judicial oeuvre is novel, and they are played in cases 
randomly served from the docket.  The skill lies in making each of 
them a memorable exemplar of an issue, problem, or approach.  
It is an essentially literary skill, which Cardozo possessed to a high 
degree.  He was also a highly competent legal analyst but no more 
so than many judges who are deservedly much less eminent than 
he.  I suspect that the disquiet that many academic lawyers feel 
about Cardozo comes from a reluctance to acknowledge that so 
“unprofessional” a skill as literary writing ability could make a 
judge great.  The academic—the lawyer generally—may admit 
that law may sometimes be poetry but is unlikely to admit that po-
etry may sometimes be law.78  The tendency of academics is to 
view judges (implicitly) as failed academics, to be flayed for the 
amusement of students.  Natural as it is, this tendency miscon-
ceives the proper division of labor between the judge and the pro-
fessor.  The judge is not to compete with the professor but to en-
gage freshly, fruitfully, vivaciously, constructively, and 
expeditiously with the disputes that he is called on to resolve.79 
Nearly a century later, some of the same rhetorical moves con-
tinue to bemuse academics.  Law professors wallow in an opinion that 
presents an arresting, if slanted, narration of facts, or whose melliflu-
ous prose glides over a questionable reading of precedent or reveals a 
 77 Id. at 133–34.  I removed an initial sentence that Judge Posner might not apply 
to his own opinions, although perhaps this is a subtle apologia to his many critics.  
“[W]e should not expect a high order either of intellectual creativity or of analytical 
rigor in even the best judicial opinions.”  Id. at 133. 
 78 This remark recalls some of James Boyd White’s work.  See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE, 
HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985) (suggesting 
that Judge Posner shares more of White’s views about the efficacy of constitutive dis-
course than his funny, but snotty, jabs about White’s use of italics would suggest).  See 
POSNER, supra note 1, at 289–90. 
 79 POSNER, supra note 13, at 133–34. 
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grand legal principle emerging from an apparently unremarkable 
lawsuit.  This is possible in part because too many legal academics 
remain, for the most part, blithely indifferent to rhetorical analysis in 
favor of legal or substantive analysis so that each generation of pro-
fessors is surprised anew at and grateful for opportunities to demon-
strate that they saw through the art to the substantive errors beneath.  
Plainly, Judge Posner understands this about his audience.  He also 
supplies wit in the eighteenth century sense.  In many opinions, he 
writes with joy, curiosity, inventiveness, fascination with law, and love 
for the English language—as he seemingly effortlessly reconstitutes 
hoary old cases as exemplars of efficiency principles.80  Like Justice 
Cardozo, he can make reading case law fun. 
While it is conventional to think of Judge Posner primarily as a 
scholar of economic analysis in law, principally motivated by the intel-
lectual insights brought to law from economics, I argue that his devo-
tion to economic analysis may be an effort at self-discipline.81  His par-
ticular genius is that he indulges one love—rhetoric—and then 
subjects it to tough love—economics.  He wields his rhetorical pen 
expertly, promoting his agenda, but it is an agenda that can, he 
claims, be measured and assessed by external, non-emotive, non-
subjective criteria.  Perhaps he is an “academic darling” because his 
opinions address (subtextually) an abiding modern anxiety about the 
intersection of power, subjectivity, and authority. 
IV. READERS RESPOND: CASEBOOK EDITORS AND LAW PROFESSORS 
So far, I have been talking about what may motivate Judge Pos-
ner.  Now I turn to the qualities that attract casebook editors and law 
professors to his opinions.  The two most important are rhetorical 
strategies he shares with Justice Cardozo.  First, he often invokes old 
“chestnut” cases.82  A citation check of the chestnut case will quickly 
 80 See, e.g., Alaska Packers’ Assoc. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902), discussed 
in Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 81 One writer perceives in Judge Posner an “antipathy toward the humanities” 
and notes his disapproval of literary critics he regards having “left-wing” agendas.  
Guyora Binder, Comment, The Poetics of the Pragmatic: What Literary Criticisms of Law 
Offers Posner, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1510, 1516–17 (2001).  I do not think Judge Pos-
ner has any antipathy to the humanities, at least not literature or rhetoric.  He seems 
to be fascinated by both.  He objects to critics who try to evaluate law using the tech-
niques of humanities disciplines. 
 82 See Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1388–90 (describing why casebook editors 
are likely to include old “chestnuts” updated with more recent opinions that invoke 
basic principles suitable for law students); Thomas J. Miles, Posner on Economic Loss in 
Tort: EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1813, 1815–16 (1974) (not-
ing Judge Posner’s discussion of twin “chestnuts”: Vosburg v. Putney from torts case-
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reveal the new Judge Posner opinion; its reliance on the old case will 
signal to editors and professors an opinion that may be useful for 
modernizing without really changing inherited teaching materials.  
Invocation of old cases also allows Judge Posner, like Justice Cardozo, 
to expound on basic and general legal principles without getting 
bogged down in the ins-and-outs of more recent precedents.83  (Per-
haps someone will analyze the semiotics of citation practice in creat-
ing casebooks!) 
Going back to basics increases the odds that the opinion will be 
anthologized in casebooks and thus remembered by subsequent gen-
erations of lawyers.84  Judge Posner’s tendency to skip over prece-
dents has provoked criticism from some practitioners, judges, and 
scholars who see Judge Posner’s disregard of precedent as unpredict-
able or activist.85  This Essay does not engage that debate.  It may be 
that, as a superb student and a long-term law professor, the old 
chestnuts come more readily to mind than they do for other judges 
who rely more upon the briefs or their clerks’ research.  The point is 
books, and Hadley v. Baxendale from contracts casebooks); see also M. Todd Hender-
son, Deconstructing Duff and Phelps, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1739, 1739–59 (2007), and J. 
Mark Ramseyer, Not-So-Ordinary Judges in Ordinary Courts: Teaching Jordan v. Duff & 
Phelps, Inc., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1199–1209 (2007) (both commenting on a rare 
Judge Posner dissent that invoked prototypical employment-at-will doctrine to chal-
lenge the applicability of established state precedent on the duty to disclose informa-
tion to employee/shareholders in small corporations, which has now become a clas-
sic case in casebooks on corporate law); Sykes, supra note 16, at 1914–15 (noting 
Judge Posner’s reliance on Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822), and 
apparent, though not logically determinative, reliance on the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965)). 
 83 See, e.g., Michael Johnson, Comment, Posner on the Uses and Disadvantages of Pre-
cedents for Law, 22 REV. LITIG. 143 (2003); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragma-
tism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 
(2000). 
 84 POSNER, supra note 13, at 61–62, 67–69.  Judge Posner notes that too much 
“law” is one of the problems facing legal educators, observing that the “rapid in-
crease in the number of judges and opinions is making it costly for lawyers, profes-
sors, and judges to determine judicial quality, and this may make them rely ever 
more heavily on the ‘signal’ of good quality emitted by the powerful reputation of a 
Cardozo.”  Id. at 69.  Note Judge Posner’s use of the rhetorical device, metonymy, in 
the phrase “a Cardozo.”  Id.  The judge with a high reputation—a Cardozo, a Pos-
ner—is like a trademark, efficiently signaling a reliable source. 
 85 See, e.g., Teresa Huang, Gaiman v. McFarlane: The Right Step in Determining Joint 
Authorship for Copyrighted Material, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 673, 693–703 (2005); Gerald 
P. Moran, A Radical Theory of Jurisprudence: The “Decisionmaker” as the South of Law—The 
Ohio Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine as a Model, 30 AKRON L. 
REV. 393, 403 n.32 (1997); Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Ex-
tending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 212–13 (1998); 
Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 109 
n.126 (2000). 
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recasting of Alaska Packers’.92 
simply that this characteristic makes Judge Posner’s opinions attrac-
tive to casebook editors who may feel the need to nod at a century or 
two of case law in just a few pages.  Moreover, if Judge Posner has ig-
nored or misstated more recent precedent, so much the merrier!  A 
professor can demonstrate acumen by pointing out the misstep to 
students and maybe publish an article to boot.  Of course some stu-
dents may hear a mixed message: the opinion is simultaneously an-
thologized and criticized.  But this is legal education’s old mixed 
message, which neither Judge Posner nor contemporary caseb
rs invented. 
Judge Posner’s use of a 1902 case, Alaska Packers’ Association v. 
Domenic86 in his 1983 decision in Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co.87 
provides a striking example of revisionism.  The Ninth Circuit de-
cided Alaska Packers’ on the ground that a contract was unenforceable 
for failure of consideration.88  Judge Posner recast it as a precedent 
on economic duress.89  Selmer sought damages for breach of a con-
struction contract despite having accepted an apparent settlement of 
the disputed amounts.  Selmer argued that the settlement was unen-
forceable because Blakeslee had procured it through economic du-
ress.  In Alaska Packers’, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a modifi-
cation to a labor contract for failure of consideration due to the pre-
existing duty rule.90  Judge Posner’s re-casting of the old case has elic-
ited scholarly interest.  In unearthing the fac
er dispute, Deborah Threedy notes that 
Judge Posner has had a great deal to do with the case being con-
sidered a [classic] duress case.  In the last twenty-five years, Alaska 
Packers’ has been cited thirteen times.  Twelve of those citations 
appeared in cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, and eight of 
those Seventh Circuit decisions were authored by Judge Posner.91 
In a similar vein, Douglas Baird argues that Judge Posner has success-
fully changed and rationalize
 
 86 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
 87 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983). 
ora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, in 
O
economic duress should be confined 
 88 Alaska Packers’, 117 F. at 105. 
 89 Selmer, 704 F.2d at 926–27. 
 90 Alaska Packers’, 117 F. at 103. 
 91 Deb
C NTRACTS STORIES 335, 342 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007) [hereinafter CONTRACTS 
STORIES]. 
 92 Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1641–53 
(2007) (arguing that Judge Posner has successfully explained that a defense to en-
forcement of a contract modification based on 
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For my purposes, the salient point is that Alaska Packers’ ap-
peared in the first edition of what is now the well-known contracts ca-
sebook edited by Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson.93  The first edition 
was published in 1959, the same year that Judge Posner went to Har-
vard Law School.  As a first year law student, he may have read it.94  As 
a judge, he has altered our reading of it.  Whatever one thinks about 
the merits of Judge Posner’s revisionism, his reading of Alaska Packers’ 
is now widely noted in the leading casebooks95 and Selmer itself has 
become a principal case in at least one casebook.96 
The second rhetorical strategy Judge Posner shares with Justice 
Cardozo is a discursive or exploratory organization for presenting the 
legal analysis.97  This is a pronounced and consistent feature of Judge 
Posner’s opinions.  Judge Posner rarely states a conclusion at or near 
the start of an opinion, and he typically proceeds through a number 
 
to those very rare—perhaps now non-existent situations—where a legal remedy 
(however modest) for breach is unobtainable). 
 93 CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTS REMEDIES 762–68(John 
Philip Dawson ed., 1959).  Alaska Packers’ has persisted as a principal case through 
the eighth edition.  CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 569 (John Philip Dawson et al. 
eds., 8th ed. 2003).  Selmer appears in a note.  Id. at 572. 
 94 Dawson taught at Harvard.  In 1959, there were two contracts casebooks in use 
at Harvard—Dawson’s and Lon Fuller’s.  Fuller’s did not contain Alaska Packers’.  E-
mail from Lesley Schoenfeld, Access Services Coordinator, Harvard Law School Spe-
cial Collections Department, to Kelly Aldrich, Reference Librarian, Reference Office, 
Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington School of Law (Apr. 2, 2008, 
10:35:47 EST) (on file with author).  I have not discovered which professor taught 
Judge Posner, but the Dawson casebook is a bestseller, now in its ninth edition.  If 
Judge Posner did not read it as a first-year student, he no doubt became aware of it as 
a law professor. 
 95 See, e.g., CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 636, 649 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 3d 
ed. 2008) (citing Threedy, supra note 91, at 639–43, and reprinting a different Judge 
Posner opinion, United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., 905 F.2d 1117 (7th 
Cir. 1990) which cites Alaska Packers’ at 649); CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 382 (Robert 
E. Scott et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (citing Judge Posner’s discussion of Alaska Packers’ 
in Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 
(1977)); PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 715 (Charles L. Knapp et 
al. eds., 6th ed. 2007). 
 96 See, e.g., 1 CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 568 (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2003). 
 97 I use “discursive” here in the sense of “[c]overing a wide field of subjects; ram-
bling” and not in the alternative sense of “[p]roceeding to a conclusion through rea-
son rather than intuition.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE, supra note 44, at 532.  Judge Posner has used the term “exploratory” in a 
similar vein to distinguish what he calls the “high” or “pure” style of opinion in which 
a judge declares the law and the judgment as if each were inevitable from the low or 
impure style in which the judge explains his options and his reasoning more infor-
mally.  Judge Posner favors the latter approach.  Posner, supra note 22, at 1426–32; 
see also Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J. L. & 
HUMAN. 201 (1990). 
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rtainty about the law or an effort 
to ca
wyers trying to give some reasonable ground for 
 
of issues and analyses before revealing to the reader the analysis he 
believes determinative.98  As far as I have discovered, he states his 
conclusion early only when dissenting.99  That makes sense, because 
the reader already knows that the dissenter disagrees with the major-
ity.  Deferring the conclusion and thereby exploring a variety of pos-
sible analyses is substantively suited to his pragmatic jurisprudence. 
Because he believes the legal rules in contested cases are often un-
clear and judges will have difficulty not applying their own values in 
such cases, he is annoyed by opinions that rely on rhetorical con-
structs, like syllogistic organization, that camouflage those defects.  
He associates the “high,” authoritative, declarative, and deductive 
style with a genuine, if misguided, ce
mouflage judicial discretion.100 
There is a tremendous amount of sheer hypocrisy in judicial opin-
ion-writing. . . .  Judges have a terrible anxiety about being 
thought to base their opinions on guesses, on their personal 
views. To allay that anxiety, they rely on the apparatus of prece-
dent and history, much of it extremely phony.  I do think judges 
can and should get away with a lot more candor, so that the pub-
lic sees what a court is—not geniuses, or even particularly erudite 
people, but just la
their opinions.101 
Discursive organization offers editors and professors an addi-
tional incentive to select or teach his opinions.  William Domnarski 
has suggested that Judge Posner’s judicial “essays” fill in where class-
room Socratic dialogue has dwindled.102  I suspect this is right.  Judge 
Posner’s opinions efficiently demonstrate what students are supposed 
to learn to do.  Read an anthologized Judge Posner opinion—or in-
deed almost any Judge Posner opinion—and you are likely to see the 
structure of an unusually smooth Socratic dialogue where hypotheti-
 98 See infra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 99 See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 444 (7th Cir. 1987) (Pos-
ner, J., dissenting).  In distinction to his majority opinions’ typical organization, 
Judge Posner states his conclusion in the first paragraph: “I disagree with this hold-
ing.  The terms of the stockholder agreement show that there was no duty of disclo-
sure, and since there was no duty there was no violation of Rule 10b-5.”  Id.  See also 
Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J., dissenting) (con-
cluding, within the first full page, that “[w]ithout more detail concerning Gattem’s 
crime, I am unconvinced that the Board made a rational judgment in classifying it as 
an ‘aggravated felony’”). 
 100 Posner, supra note 22, at 1432–33.  But see Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note 
25, and Wald, Reply to Judge Posner, supra note 25. 
 101 Linda Greenhouse, Interview; In His Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at 14 
(quoting Judge Richard A. Posner). 
 102 WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 143 (1996). 
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cal solutions are raised, examined, and then discarded seriatim until 
one arrives finally at a satisfactory solution.103  Judge Posner ev
ctual hypotheticals, just as a classroom professor might.104 
This discursive approach has other advantages for page-
constrained editors and time-constrained professors.  In the course of 
raising and discarding alternative possible analyses of the issues in a 
case, Judge Posner also provides capsule summaries of doctrine and 
juxtaposes doctrinal “cousins,” effectively demonstrating just the skill 
that most traditional law professors want their students to demon-
strate on exams—the ability to analyze a given set of facts through 
multiple doctrinal lenses.  It has also struck me that Judge Posner’s 
opinions sometimes read li
potter” hypotheticals. 
Judge Posner’s discursive organization also adds some suspense, 
making his opinions more interesting to read than the run of the mill 
opinions.  A Judge Posner opinion has a beginning, middle, and end 
that build and then resolve a certain legal tension—an opinion that 
begins with issue and conclusion cannot create much suspense.  
Sometimes, where the facts are key to the legal issue, Judge Posner 
 
 103 See Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988) (ex-
amining a series of possible interpretations of the duty of “good faith” in a require-
ments contract); Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 
1985) (explaining the difference between a liquidated damages clause and a penalty 
clause with reflections on freedom of contract and efficient breach); Morin Bldg. 
Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr. Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining whether 
a jury instruction was correct by examining different state law rules governing wheth-
er exercise of a satisfaction clause is subject to a reasonableness standard); Selmer 
Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining the reasons 
for making some, but not all, forms of coercion or pressure illegal for purposes of 
contract formation).  See also In re Oakley, 344 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2003) (sequencing 
arguments for classifying a bankrupt’s property as tangible or intangible under an 
exemption statute); Harmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 
1993) (presenting various arguments for and against equitable reformation of an in-
surance contract where the insured was murdered by the putative beneficiary); Bra-
zell v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust of Rockford, 982 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1992) (consider-
ing various factual arguments supporting a claim for fraud on a loan guarantor); 
Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986) (considering various factual claims to 
ownership of a painting in light of laws on bailment, abandonment and conversion). 
 104 See Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2007) (hypothesiz-
ing, “[s]uppose Guidant had stolen half the money in a plan participant’s retirement 
account and a suit by the participant resulted in a judgment for that amount”); Las-
kowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 937 (7th Cir. 2006) (hypothesizing, “[s]uppose that 
it turns out that some part of the grant to Notre Dame was used to defray the cost of 
religious activities at the other schools.  Several possibilities would then heave into 
view”). 
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c legal dispute—no matter what one ultimately thinks of 
the m
n make the law more interest-
ing t
cursive approach in contract cases.110  In re Oakley111 provides an ex-
lets them drive the plot,105 but more typically his fact descriptions are 
remarkable more for clarity and brevity than rhetorical flair.  In this, 
his facts differ markedly from Justice Cardozo’s in the famous open-
ing to Hynes.106  Raw manipulation of facts to pull on the heartstrings 
might appeal to non-rational instincts.  Instead, Judge Posner creates 
suspense by tempting readers down superficially plausible analytic 
pathways and then, just when he has them going, reveals an obstacle 
they had not anticipated.  He may repeat the trick several times until 
at last he reveals the direct line to the most sensible outcome.107  His 
authorial persona replicates the Socratic professor’s in seeming to 
explore new ground.  Reading an opinion like this is more fun—at 
least for academics and students, if not practicing attorneys—than 
reading the more standard, syllogistic resolution of yet another taw-
dry or tragi
erits. 
It is not that Judge Posner has more interesting cases than other 
judges do.  He imbues his cases, for the student if not for the practi-
tioner, with interest and excitement, maybe even passion.. The stu-
dent’s attention is redirected to the evolving drama of Judge Posner’s 
revelation of “the path of the law” and often away from the dispute 
and the parties.  Just as a great critic can make a review more interest-
ing than the book, so Judge Posner ca
han the conflict that occasions it. 
Both Selmer108 and Lake River109 provide clear examples of this dis-
 
 105 See Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the possible skull-
duggery about a painting.); Cecaj v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2006) (discuss-
ing the abuse of an asylum-seeker). 
–900 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo be-
  r stat-
ing the f eco-
nomic ne ex-
ample
 106 Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 131 N.E. 898, 898
gins by stating, “On July 8, 1916, Harvey Hynes, a lad of sixteen, swam with two com-
panions from the Manhattan to the Bronx side of the Harlem River or United States 
Ship canal, a navigable stream.”). 
 107 See infra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
108 Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983).  Afte
 issue as whether Wisconsin contract law would recognize the defense o
 duress and reciting the facts, Judge Posner begins the analysis with a fi
 of the “impure” or “low” style.  See supra note 97. 
If you extract a promise by means of a threat, the promise is unen-
forceable.  That is not, as is so often stated, because such a promise is 
involuntary unless “involuntary” is a conclusion rather than the de-
scription of a mental state.  If the threat is ferocious (“your money or 
your life”) and believed, the victim may be desperately eager to fend it 
off with a promise.  Such promises are made unenforceable in order to 
discourage threats by making them less profitable.  The fundamental 
issue in a duress case is therefore not the victim’s state of mind but 
whether the statement that induced the promise is the kind of offer to 
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deal that we want to discourage, and hence that we call a “threat.”  
Selmer argues that Blakeslee-Midwest said to it in effect, “give up 
$53,000 of your claim for extras [$120,000 minus $67,000] or you will 
get nothing.”  This has the verbal form of a threat but is easily recast as 
a promise innocuous on its face—“I promise to pay you $67,000 for a 
release of your claim.”  There is a practical argument against treating 
parent lesson on the availability of a judicial remedy (perhaps inadequate) as 
9–90 (7th Cir. 1985) 
 
Judge Posner used unusually complex sentence 
d style to explain why the debtor cannot exempt $2700 cash from the reach of 
the 
such a statement as a threat: it will make an inference of duress ines-
capable in any negotiation where one party makes an offer from which 
it refuses to budge, for the other party will always be able to argue that 
he settled only because there was a (figurative) gun at his head. 
Selmer, 704 F.2d at 926–27 (citations omitted).  Possibly contrary Wisconsin cases are 
not discussed, although their existence is indicated by “cf.” citations.  Id. at 927.  
Great attention is paid, however, to Alaska  Packers’.  Id.  Then, in a transition that 
would surely puzzle the average first-year student, the opinion turns into a less-than-
trans
the determinant of whether contract modifications or settlements that result from 
economic bullying during performance will be enforced.  Id.  The topic of good faith 
in performance never comes up.  Good stuff to discuss with first-year law students, 
no? 
 109 Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 128
(explaining how to differentiate a penalty clause from a liquidated damages clause, 
while minimizing the significance of the contract language and ignoring all but di-
rect performance costs).  For a good discussion of the case and why it has become a 
casebook standard, see Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1448–55. 
 110 A random selection of less well-known Judge Posner opinions reveals mini-
lectures on legal analysis.  See, e.g., Farmers Auto Ins. Ass’n. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. 
Co., 482 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2007) (regarding insurance contract interpretation); 
Westowne Shoes v. Brown Group, 104 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1997) (regarding a fran-
chise dispute); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 182 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (discussing a contract breach, and comparing mitigation of damages with 
comparative fault defenses in tort).  I happened upon one recent Judge Posner opin-
ion that was not well-written.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 485 F.3d 930 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (involving a breach of a confidentiality clause and theft of trade secrets). 
This case struck me as atypical in that the prose was convoluted and the facts were 
hard to follow.  See id. at 931–32.  
structures.  The seriatim discussion of legal issues is needlessly opaque.  It is never 
quite clear whether the determinative issue is the enforceability of an employee as-
signment, non-compete and confidentiality agreement, or the trade secret status of 
the arguably assigned information. 
 111 In re Oakley involves a bankruptcy exemption statute and provides a mini-
lecture on the economic difference between tangible and intangible property.  In re 
Oakley, 344 F.3d 709, 711–13 (7th Cir. 2003).  Judge Posner uses a particularly de-
tache
bankruptcy trustee because it exceeds the $100 maximum for “intangible” prop-
erty.  Id. at 714.  The opinion offers a classic instrumentalist analysis that focuses on 
why the statute might distinguish between tangible and intangible property.  Id. at 
713. 
The opinion provides a history lesson in the common law distinctions between 
tangible and intangible property.  Id. at 713–14.  But, I found the outcome and rhe-
toric distressing.  The debtor—about whose earning capacity Judge Posner provided 
no information—was left by the decision with exempt “intangible” property of $100 
in cash and $900 in “tangible” clothing and goods, for a total of $1000.  Id. at 714.  
The Indiana statute permitted an exemption of $100 of intangible assets and $4000 
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ample in a bankruptcy case; and Unites States Department of Education v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association,112 is an example in an evidence 
case. 
The Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley 
Cookies, Ltd. provides a partial counterpoint to Judge Posner’s usual 
discursive organization.113  While Judge Posner does not state the bot-
tom line at the very beginning of the opinion, he rather uncharacter-
istically states his conclusion as to each substantive issue as soon as he 
raises it.114  Judge Cudahy’s dissent may have inspired Judge Posner to 
write more definitively in order to counter Judge Cudahy’s critique 
that the Judge Posner’s analysis of both the facts and the law were 
“implausible,” “so lopsided as to be almost droll—if it were not seri-
ous business,” and “equally one-sided.”115  Judge Posner’s dissent in 
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.116 is also closer to the pure style and much 
less discursive—at least until the end when Judge Posner provides a 
laundry list of factors that ought to be considered in such cases.117  As 
noted above, this makes sense, given that he is arguing against the 
majority decision and is only concerned with correcting its errors. 
of tangible assets.  Id. at 710.  The debtor had attempted to exempt $2700 in cash. 
Id. at 711.  The opinion does not explain why so much of his assets was in cash—
 
whether he had just sold a car, for example, when foreclosure struck, or whether 
there was a nefarious reason.  Judge Posner does not address the fact that the debtor 
ended up with only about one quarter of what Indiana would have exempted had the 
cash been deemed tangible.  Judge Posner explains that the intent of the statute is to 
prevent debtors from shielding liquid assets because those are the kind that creditors 
can use most efficiently, and he used a classic cost/benefit rationale to show that any 
other interpretation would make credit more expensive for all.  Id. at 712–13.  He 
does not mention the possibility that the Indiana statute might have been designed 
to ensure that bankrupts were left with $4100 of assets. 
The style alternates between historical erudition and near-comedy.  The opinion 
provides a clever illustration of the difference between intangible and tangible prop-
erty: “A napkin has value; you can wipe your mouth with it.  Wallpaper has value; you 
can decorate your walls with it.  People do not wipe their mouths with money or pa-
per their walls with it.”  Id. at 713.  I thought that these references bordered on bath-
room humor—hinting at what you can use to wipe what.  I also thought that the ref-
erence to wallpaper was insultingly frivolous in this bankruptcy context. 
 112 United States Dep’t. of Educ. v. Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 481 F.3d 936, 
938–42 (7th Cir. 2007) (raising and dismissing a sequence of reasons why the NCAA 
might claim a privilege). 
 113 Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 
970 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 114 Id. at 276. 
 115 Id. at 283 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
 116 815 F.2d 429, 444–52 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 117 Id. at 451–52 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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V. WHAT MIGHT A PROFESSOR DO DIFFERENTLY? 
I believe that an explicit focus on rhetorical strategies can reveal 
important messages that conventional readings and substantive cri-
tiques may miss.  This Part presents a few ideas about what professors 
might share with students.  I will use two very different opinions to il-
lustrate my points. 
Let us suppose that a professor wanted to encourage students to 
think deliberately about why one of the apparent aims and certainly 
one of the common effects of traditional legal education is to dis-
abuse new students of certain assumptions that may have served them 
reasonably well in lay life.  For example, law schools are famous for 
shocking new law students into recognizing that their intuitions 
about what is right or wrong may not be apt or sufficiently nuanced 
to serve in legal practice.  Or, to take another more complicated ex-
ample, legal education may undermine some students’ assumptions 
that law and morality are entwined, that legal behavior should also be 
moral (by some criterion), and that moral behavior should be legal. 
If a professor wanted st udents to reflect on how the process of legal 
education may effect these transformations without providing any 
theoretical materials relevant to the underlying jurisprudential issues, 
that professor might focus on Judge Posner because of his frank dis-
regard for moralism.118 
Another strategy would be to share with students some of what 
Judge Posner has written extra-judicially about the issue and put his 
life and times in some sort of intellectual and political context.  This 
seems to me an approach more interesting, rigorous, and honest 
than simply assigning his opinions among a stream of opinions that 
seem to be about doctrine. 
One could also focus on how Judge Posner’s rhetorical strategies 
reflect his views on the intersection of law and conventional ideas of 
“good” behavior and what his status in the legal academy and profes-
sion suggests about acceptance of his attitudes.  At least three discus-
sions might emerge.  The first considers how Judge Posner handles 
the doctrine of good faith in contract performance, a vexatio
trinal nomenclature for a judge hostile to moralistic arguments. 
second considers the role of empathy for a party, or the rheto
lance of empathy, in a judicial opinion.  The third considers the 
construction of an authoritative voice in the legal profession. 
 
 118 Such an exercise would focus on the formation of “professional identity,” a 
type of lesson the Carnegie Report advocates.  THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 
126–61. 
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issues on appeal.  The first concerned diversity of citizenship for fed-
eral jurisdiction.124  The second concerned whether Market Street 
 
A. Using Discursive Organization to Change Readers’ Understanding 
A close reading of Judge Posner’s discursive organization of 
Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey119 illustrates a subtext of 
what “good faith” does and does not mean for Judge Posner.  Market 
Street is reproduced in at least one contracts casebook120 and has at-
tracted scholarly comment.121  In Judge Posner’s hands, the case in-
volves the duty of good faith in performance of contracts.  I use this 
mundane case to illustrate Judge Posner’s extraordinary ability to at-
tract attention to an opinion that surely never would have emerged 
from the reports into casebooks and scholarship without his assiduity.
Few other judges or academics would have perceived the opportunity 
to craft a novel lesson on the duty of good faith in contract perform-
ance in this appeal. 
Market Street, a lessee of shopping mall property, sued the Gen-
eral Electric Pension Trust, lessor of the property.122  Market Street 
sought specific performance of the Trust’s alleged contractual duty to 
convey title of the property at the Trust’s cost upon failure of the par-
ties to negotiate a loan to finance improvements.123  There were three 
 119 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 120 1 CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION, supra note 96, at 598. 
 121 See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street Asso-
ciates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (2007); see also, Cunningham, 
supra note 5, at 1409 (making an extended analysis of Justice Cardozo’s and Judge 
Posner’s opinions and arguing, in part, that Judge Posner turns Justice Cardozo’s 
n mance “upside down”). 
ket Street Assoc. Ltd., 941 F.2d at 589. 
 lecture 
should also send a chill down the spine of the law student aspiring to litigate. 
u derstanding of good faith in contract perfor
 122 Mar
 123 Id. 
 124 Although the first two issues are edited out of the Macaulay casebook, Judge 
Posner’s analysis might be useful to civil procedure or professional responsibility pro-
fessors—at least if they might want to produce an in terrorem effect.  Toward inept 
counsel, Judge Posner does not emulate Justice Cardozo’s alleged “saintliness.”  Mar-
ket Street Associates, a limited partnership, had sued the General Electric Pension 
Trust in Wisconsin state court, and the Trust had removed the suit to federal court 
where the district court accepted jurisdiction.  Id. at 589.  Judge Posner delivers a lec-
ture to the lower court, the Trust’s counsel, and law students—who might be reading 
the unexpurgated version—on the need to establish complete diversity of citizenship 
among all the parties, including the limited partners.  Id. at 589–90.  While it is quite 
proper that the Seventh Circuit should insist on proof of jurisdiction, the fact that 
counsel did manage, however belatedly, to demonstrate complete diversity makes it 
interesting that Judge Posner sets out the rules in a case in where neither the rule 
nor the rule’s application was contested.  Id.  One would have thought that the lec-
ture would have been more apt in a case where jurisdiction was not obtained or was 
questionable.  Be that as it may, this short lecture illustrates one of Judge Posner’s 
authorial characteristics that must make him attractive to law professors.  The
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 by withholding information about the case, much 
less i
 
had waived its right to trial by bringing a motion for summary judg-
ment.125  The third concerned the meaning of “g
 performance, and this issue predominates.126 
Judge Posner uses the opinion’s opening paragraph to suggest, 
rather than define, this third issue.  He also uses the opening para-
graph to inspire the reader to keep reading.  The paragraph opens, 
“Market Street Associates . . . appeal[s] from a judgment for the de-
fendants . . . entered upon cross-motions for summary judgment in a 
diversity suit that pivots on the doctrine of ‘good faith’ performance 
of a contract.”127  It closes with “[b]ut before we can get to the sub-
stance of the dispute we need to consider a jurisdictional and a pro-
cedural question.”128  The first sentence creates some modest interest 
and perhaps a touch of suspense, at least for the weary academic 
reader, precisely because the issue is not technically defined.  Note 
the vivid but vague verb “pivot.”129  And true to form, Judge Posner 
withholds the court’s answer.  The last sentence preserves the narra-
tive momentum, propelling the reader through the first two technical 
issues with the assurance that after considering them, “we can get to 
the substance of the dispute.”130  Eight paragraphs later, after defense 
counsel has been thoroughly admonished for sloppiness, “[w
st to the contract dispute out of which the case arises.”131 
So far, so good, one might think.  Judge Posner has managed to 
create some interest about a dull squabble between a developer and 
an institutional investor over a small parcel in a shopping mall.  Ob-
serve that the facts—discouragingly tedious, involving interpretation 
of Paragraph 34 of a lease—are not mentioned in the opening para-
graph.  Instead, Judge Posner manages to create a little suspense out 
of next to nothing
ts resolution. 
Note the use of “we” in the first and the eighth paragraphs.132  
Although the first person plural is commonly used in majority appel-
late opinions, Judge Posner’s usage subtly shifts from a reference to 
his judicial colleagues on the panel to his common enterprise with 
the reader.  After all, by the time an opinion appears in the reports, 
 125 Id. at 590. 
 126 Id. at 589. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Market Street, 941 F.2d at 589. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 591. 
 132 Id. at 589, 591. 
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and the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
 
the judges on the panel have already taken and completed the ana-
lytic journey.  So, a sentence like this one, ”But before we can get to 
the substance of the dispute we need to consider a jurisdictional and 
a procedural question,”133 is pure artifice.  The putative judicial “we” 
has already considered and decided these issues.  Instead, this famil-
iar “we” has subtly shifted its meaning to “you, dear reader, and I.”  
Readers must also be subtly flattered, or at least relieved, by inclusion 
in this “we.”  By the time, in paragraph eight, “we come at last”134 to 
the merits, “we” must breathe a sigh of relief that “we”—unlike hap-
less defense counsel—have not wasted the c
erstand and comply with “settled law.”135 
“We,” the readers, have been invited up onto the bench where 
we can join with Judge Posner in sorting out the only interesting is-
sue.  “We” are safely distant from counsel or party.  Judge Posner did 
not invent emotional distance or the literary features that create or 
support it, of course.  Emotional distance typifies an appeal, which is 
conducted mostly, if not exclusively, by written arguments about legal 
authority, and it is normalized in the practice of teaching law through 
appellate opinions.136  But Judge Posner steps back even further than 
legal procedures require.  He is adept, and probably self-conscious, in 
using rhetoric to distance the reader from a party and even its lawyer 
if the reader’s emotional detachment will support his analysis.  Pro-
moting detachment is consonant with his distaste for moralizing in 
legal analysis.  In this case, the rhetorical technique detaches the 
reader from the facts of the dispute and, in a nice twist, arguably at-
taches the reader emotionally and intellectually to the judge and to 
his view of the case.  Most readers, perhaps especially law students, 
will indulge in schadenfreude—delighting in the mise
e Posner skewers the lawyers for their mistakes. 
There is still more to say about this superficially mundane first 
paragraph.  Just after the first sentence appears a “cf.” citation to a 
1968 article by Robert Summers137 on “good faith” in common law 
 133 Id. at 589. 
 134 Market Street, 941 F.2d. at 591. 
 135 Id. at 590. 
 136 See MERTZ, supra note 9, at 67, 82–83, 120–28. 
 137 Robert Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 232–43 (1968).  Of course, Judge Pos-
ner might have cited Article 2’s notice provisions as persuasive authorities to support 
his decision that Market Street could not sue for specific performance without first 
providing the Trust with a clear warning that it planned to exercise its rights to the 
property.  See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-606, 2-608.  But he did not. 
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(U.C.C.).138  There is no need for a citation there at all.  Judge Posner 
then explains that Wisconsin common law governs this dispute and 
that Articles 2 and 2A of the U.C.C. do not.139  Judges typically an-
nounce the source of governing law, but it is unusual to explain why 
some other body of law does not govern where there is no conceiv-
able argument that it might.  At first, I thought this was just an exam-
ple of a writer following his own lead.  Having cited an article whose 
title referred to common law and to the U.C.C., perhaps Judge Pos-
ner thought he needed to announce that the U.C.C. does not apply. 
But I now think the citation and subsequent sentence are artful.  
The superfluous citation to an old article by Summers, a renowned 
scholar, signals erudition in the author and significance for the opin-
ion.  The age of the article—written shortly after the states’ wide-
spread adoption of Article 2—and the eminence of the author signal 
that the opinion will deal with fundamental issues, not with recent 
twists of state precedent.  This citation serves the same purpose as cit-
ing old chestnut cases.  The detailed explanation of which law gov-
erns—surely superfluous for the lawyer and unedifying to the lay 
reader—seems peculiarly directed to contracts professors for whom 
Article 2’s scope might be an early lesson.  Even the narrative struc-
ture, described above as a tool for generating reader interest, would 
suit a contracts casebook editor.  The last sentence of the first para-
graph and the first sentence of the eighth make it a breeze for the 
editor to cut the jurisdictional and procedural issues without drafting 
the slightest editorial transition.140 
If we now proceed with Judge Posner to the substantive good 
faith performance issue, on which the case “pivots,” his odd usage at 
the beginning of the opinion begins to make sense.  The vagueness of 
“pivots” not only keeps the reader interested but also preserves Judge 
Posner’s characterization of the issue from misstatement.141  We will 
learn at the end of the opinion that the precise issue on appeal is not 
whether the parties acted in good faith, but whether, in finding that 
the plaintiff had not acted in good faith and in granting the Trust’s 
summary judgment motion, the trial court applied the appropriate 
standard.142  But first Judge Posner wants to use the opinion to dis-
abuse readers, including perhaps the district court, of any naïve no-
tion that “good faith” in contract law means what it does in the ver-
 138 Market Street, 941 F.2d at 589. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 589, 591. 
 141 Id. at 589. 
 142 Id. at 597–98. 
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nacular.  He defers to the very end the actual holding that the case 
must be remanded to correct a possible procedural error143—the re-
cord indicated that the lower court may not have viewed the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Market Street as the non-moving 
party.144 
In the meantime, however, Judge Posner discusses the merits 
and emphasizes the paradox that a decision for the Trust would save 
it from the consequences of failing to read and understand its own 
contract.145  Describing a possible judgment as paradoxical creates 
dramatic tension because it signals that the judgment will indeed be 
for the Trust.  If not, there would be no need to mention a paradox.  
But Judge Posner does not actually believe there is a paradox.  In-
stead, this is a rhetorical device to frame Posner’s explanation of 
good faith. 
Recall that the case arose on Market Street’s suit for specific per-
formance and the Trust’s motion for summary judgment on the 
ground, among others, that Market Street had not acted in good faith 
when it failed to call the Trust’s attention to Paragraph 34 after the 
Trust failed to respond to its financing request.146  The Trust’s agent 
had ignored the plaintiff’s request for financing apparently without 
recognizing that this refusal might be treated as a breakdown of fi-
nancing negotiations and, thus, the condition precedent to the de-
fendant’s duty to convey the property back to the plaintiff at a favor-
able price.  Market Street apparently did not give defendant prior 
notice that it regarded the Trust’s non-response as a breach of the 
duty to negotiate and, as such, the condition precedent to the exer-
cise of its right under Paragraph 34.147  In other words, Market Street 
seems to have engaged in contract “gotcha.” 
But Judge Posner is not interested in proceeding directly to an 
analysis of whether Market Street was entitled to behave in this way 
under the terms of the contract or, perhaps, under standards of rea-
sonable commercial behavior.  He prefers to discuss the Trust’s slop-
py conduct, and he characterizes the Trust’s problem as a failure to 
read and understand.148  I doubt that most business people would 
characterize the Trust’s problem as a failure to read or understand its 
contract.  Instead, its agent’s rudeness in failing to respond to Market 
 143 Id. at 598. 
 144 Market Street, 941 F.2d at 597. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 592. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 597. 
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Street and its negligence in failing to better supervise or train the 
agent or to have better risk management procedures in place are 
management mistakes.  But Judge Posner characterizes the Trust’s 
behavior as a failure to read and understand its own contract because 
the reference to reading and understanding neatly anticipates his lat-
er discussion of the misnamed and technically irrelevant “duty to 
read” doctrine.149 
Courts use the “duty to read” doctrine to determine the scope of 
a party’s contractual obligation under written terms the party could 
have read, regardless of whether the party did in fact read them.150  
The Trust never argued that it had not read or understood Paragraph 
34.  It argued that it had not been notified that Market Street ex-
pected to exercise a right.151  The question on appeal was not whether 
the Trust was bound by the terms in the lease, which it may not have 
read or fully understood before signing—the scenario where the pre-
formation “duty to read” applies.  Judge Posner understood all of this 
perfectly, we can be sure.  Instead, his description of the Trust’s con-
duct as a failure to read the lease creates a verbal, associative link to 
the “duty to read” doctrine that camouflages the leap in legal logic 
from all but the most critical readers. 
One might wonder why he bothers.  I suspect he makes this ra-
ther strenuous rhetorical effort to persuade the reader that the pre-
contractual “duty to read” doctrine is pertinent because its presence 
gives him an excuse for explaining the economic rationale for dispa-
rate treatment of pre- and post-contract behavior and for avoiding a 
moralistic evaluation of the parties’ relative good faith. 
The pre-contractual duty to read establishes a hard-nosed prin-
ciple in which good faith is irrelevant.152  Absent fraud or misrepre-
sentation, pre-contractual parties have no duty to correct one an-
other’s oversights or mistakes.153  Starting here, Judge Posner, in 
similarly non-moralistic terms, contrasts parties’ duties after a con-
tract is formed.  The duty to alert another contracted party to its own 
mistake is not because of moralistic sounding duty of good faith, but 
 149 Id. 
 150 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run 
by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1052–55 
(1966); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (1997) (holding 
purchasers of a computer bound by an arbitration term in a contract enclosed with a 
computer despite their claim that they had not read the contract closely enough to 
have discovered the arbitration clause). 
 151 Market Street, 941 F.2d at 597. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
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because it is efficient to do so.  Judge Posner explains his controver-
sial default rule for contract performance: 
[T]he overriding purpose of contract law . . . is to give the parties 
what they would have stipulated for expressly if at the time of 
making the contract they had had complete knowledge of the fu-
ture and the costs of negotiating and adding provisions to the 
contract had been zero. 
. . . .  
To be able to correct your contract partner’s mistake at zero cost 
to yourself, and decide not to do so, is a species of opportunistic 
behavior that the parties would have expressly forbidden in the 
contract had they foreseen it.154 
We can now understand Judge Posner’s curious usage.  The appeal 
“pivoted” on the trial court’s evaluation of Market Street’s good faith, 
but Judge Posner prefers not to discuss the case on those terms.  By 
focusing initially on the paradox that the Trust might win despite its 
carelessness, he diverts the reader’s attention from Market Street’s 
“gotcha” tactics, and he contrives a doctrine that allows him to shift 
the analysis from the moralistic vocabulary of good faith to the new, 
economic vocabulary of efficiency.  The effect of this rather elaborate 
framing is to remind and persuade the reader that there is no gener-
alized duty to be one’s “brother’s keeper,”155 and the duty of good 
faith during performance is merely a default rule about efficiency.  I 
suspect that Judge Posner would say that he, unlike Justice Cardozo, 
has given a reason for his judgment. 
I hope I have illustrated how much students could learn from at-
tending to why Judge Posner may use a particular rhetorical tech-
nique, like discursive organization.  An ordinary judge might have re-
solved the case on narrow grounds without the need for a lesson 
about good faith.  The judge could rely on the language of the infa-
mous Paragraph 34, which provided that both parties “shall negotiate 
in good faith.”156  The plaintiff had neither negotiated nor made any 
serious effort to provoke the Trust into negotiating.  The judge could 
 154 Id. at 596–97.  Cf. Morin Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413 
(7th Cir. 1983) (relying on a comparable type of default rule—that contract satisfac-
tion clauses are interpreted to mean what a reasonable person would find satisfactory 
absent evidence that the parties really bargained for subjective satisfaction).  See gen-
erally Scott Brewer, Satisfaction and Posner’s Morin Opinion: Aliquando Bonus Dormitat 
Posnerus?, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1123 (deconstructing the logic of Morin’s reasoning). 
 155 Genesis 4:9.  Here is a real “chestnut” reference—the biblical story of Cain and 
Abel.  It is interesting that the phrase has come to stand for the opposite, I think, of 
the biblical story’s import.  Cain was not supposed to kill his brother.  His question is 
rhetorical and designed to evade responsibility.  See id. at 4:1–16. 
 156 Market Street, 941 F.2d at 592. 
O'NEILL (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:17:41 PM 
546 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:507 
 
also have held that the plaintiff’s failure to provide notice was itself a 
breach of the duty of good faith and sufficient to preclude an equita-
ble remedy. 
B. Creating Empathy, or a Semblance of It 
I turn now to lessons about how a skilled writer may create em-
pathy in the reader, or its semblance in the authorial persona.  The 
Green Bag reprinted Judge Posner’s opinion in Cecaj v. Gonzales157 in its 
annual compilation of exemplary legal writings.158  Judge Posner’s 
statement of facts seems a model for the creation of empathy.  The 
case was an appeal from a denial of a petition for asylum.  The first is-
sue was whether the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had erred 
in holding that there was not substantial evidence that an applicant 
for asylum in the United States had been persecuted in Albania.159  
Because the issue involved the weighing of evidence, the opinion pre-
sents a relatively rare instance where Judge Posner focuses more on 
the facts than on the legal analysis.  He narrates the following in vivid 
but dispassionate terms: 
In 1998, Cecaj—whom the immigration judge found wholly cred-
ible—was arrested following a political protest in which he had 
participated.  He was detained for six days and during that period 
was beaten by masked police with rubber truncheons and also 
kicked, suffering injuries that required his hospitalization.  A few 
days after his release from the hospital, a member of the Socialist 
Party accosted Cecaj on the street and fired a gun near his head, 
an act that Cecaj sensibly interpreted as a threat.  He fled to 
Greece but returned in 2000 and resumed his political activity 
with the New Democratic Party. . . .  The following year, after an 
unsuccessful run for mayor of his hometown, he stood for the Al-
banian parliament on the New Democratic Party ticket in his ho-
metown, which was dominated by the Socialist Party.  Although he 
was a well-known local figure and candidate for public office, he 
was arrested during the campaign and beaten by the police, os-
tensibly for not having identification papers on him.  He also re-
ceived threatening phone calls, which he believed came from the 
police.  The last straw was the kidnapping of his 10-year-old 
brother by unknown persons who told the child that he was being 
kidnapped because of Cecaj’s political activity and that the child 
 157 440 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 158 THE GREEN BAG ALMANAC OF USEFUL AND ENTERTAINING TIDBITS FOR LAWYERS & 
READER OF GOOD LEGAL WRITING FROM THE PAST YEAR, 239–42 (Ross E. Davies ed., 
2006). 
 159 Cecaj, 440 F.3d at 898–99. 
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“would end up dead” if Cecaj “didn’t do what they say.”  The child 
was released unharmed after a few hours but Cecaj received a call 
in which “they said that [the kidnapping] was the last warning.”  
Cecaj prudently abandoned his candidacy and left Albania with 
his wife.160 
The next paragraph reports, in deadpan tone, the BIA’s explanation 
of why each one of these incidents, standing alone, failed to consti-
tute evidence of persecution, and the following paragraph provides 
Judge Posner’s evaluation. 
The immigration judge’s analysis of the evidence was radically de-
ficient.  He failed to consider the evidence as a whole, as he was 
required to by the elementary principles of administrative law.  
Instead he broke it into fragments.  Suppose you saw someone 
holding a jar and you said, “That’s a nice jar,” and he smashed it 
to smithereens and said, “No, it’s not a jar.”  That is what the im-
migration judge did.161 
The opinion thus presents a short, clear, and persuasive statement of 
the facts—followed by an unequivocal conclusion and a vivid, if odd, 
simile.162  By sequencing the abuses inflicted on Cecaj, Judge Posner 
 160 Id. at 898 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
 161 Id. at 899. 
 162 The conclusion and example are, of course, not part of the statement of facts, 
but it is easier to discuss these fairly characteristic rhetorical moves in context at this 
time.  I find the simile odd because it seems to compare abuse by political actors in a 
failed, or nearly failed, state with a “nice jar” and then to compare the administrative 
judge’s decision to “smash[ing] it to smithereens.”  See id.  It is certainly an arresting 
image, especially because language like this is so rare in judicial writing.  The com-
parisons are puzzling, to say the least, but the simile is probably effective in produc-
ing agreement by most readers, if only because it stops a reader from plowing mind-
lessly and unfeelingly into the intricacies of appellate review of administrative 
decisions.  The simile turns the administrative judge into a perverse bully, much like 
Cecaj’s Albanian tormentors.  For me, the jar also suggests a remote literary refer-
ence to a well-known Wallace Stevens poem, Anecdote of the Jar (1919), which Judge 
Posner has probably read even if he did not intend an allusion.  In an interesting co-
incidence, Thomas Grey has written on both Stevens and Judge Posner.  See THOMAS 
C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY 1–2 (1991). 
One might accuse Judge Posner of the failing to give any “reasons” for his judg-
ment, just as he accused Justice Cardozo of failing to give “reasons” for the judgment 
in Hynes.  See POSNER, supra note 13, at 33.  Most of the rest of the opinion is devoted 
to arguing with the administrative judge’s inferences or failures to draw inferences 
from imperfect evidence of the Albanian government’s complicity in Cecaj’s persecu-
tion.  Cecaj, 440 F.3d at 899–900.  Judge Posner’s chief point is a bare assertion that 
the “elementary principles of administrative law” require the judge to evaluate the 
evidence as a whole.  Id. at 899.  He does not discuss the cases he cites.  See id.  This 
criticism may be unfair to the extent that Judge Posner does not want to take the 
time to reiterate reasons he has articulated elsewhere for not deferring to the admin-
istrative law judge.  See Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation and Immigration Law, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1671–87 (2007) (noting that Judge Posner, along with many other 
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paints a horrifying picture of political persecution that seems to speak 
for itself and renders absurd the administrative judge’s apparent de-
mand of proof that each incident was government-sponsored or gov-
ernment-sanctioned persecution.163  In reciting Cecaj’s fate twice, 
once in Judge Posner’s words and then in the administrative judge’s 
deconstructed version, Judge Posner emphasizes the double trap in 
which Cecaj was caught: abuse in Albania and bureaucratic indiffer-
ence in the United States.164  Only a hard-hearted reader could fail to 
boil up with indignation, but Judge Posner avoids any overtly emo-
tional language.  He is the dispassionate judge, tipping his hand only 
slightly near the end of the first paragraph where the phrase, “the last 
straw” and the word “prudently” subtly signal adoption of Cecaj’s 
point of view.165 
This effective organization and tone produces an emotional re-
sponse in the reader while preserving the persona of a dispassionate 
judicial author.  Is Judge Posner consciously appealing to the reader’s 
empathy?  I would think so.  The reader’s empathy and sense of out-
rage will carry most readers past the later descriptions of possible de-
fects in the petitioner’s evidence, which do raise some questions 
about whether the perpetrators of Cecaj’s persecution were acting on 
behalf of or with the acquiescence of the Albanian government.  Em-
pathy will probably deflect all but the most skeptical readers from 
questioning whether Judge Posner is correct to treat the BIA’s find-
ings as errors of law. 
It would be easy for a reader to conclude that Judge Posner feels 
empathy for Cecaj, and he well may.  But I think that is beside the 
point, as Judge Posner would certainly agree.  Instead, careful atten-
tion to the structure of this opinion suggests that the real target of 
Judge Posner’s ire is the BIA judge.  Perhaps that is why the facts are 
written so vividly.  The point may not be to save Cecaj so much as it is 
to make the judge look clueless—reversibly clueless. 
It is consistent with what we know about Judge Posner’s anti-
moralism to think that he is deploying his rhetorical skills here to 
chastise institutional incompetence, not to save the oppressed of oth-
er nations.  My point is not that Judge Posner should or should not 
feel empathy or write in a way that inspires empathy.  Instead, my 
point is that readers and students should be careful about succumb-
federal judges, has lost confidence in immigration law judges’ capacity for accurately 
finding and evaluating facts or for interpreting and applying the law). 
 163 See Cecaj, 440 F.3d at 898–900. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 898. 
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ing to a fallacy that Judge Posner has warned against: concluding that 
one knows an author’s personal views from the moods his rhetoric 
may inspire.166 
Even so sophisticated a reader as Martha Nussbaum temporarily 
succumbed to the fallacy—perhaps from friendship and wishful 
thinking.  In a welcome essay on Judge Posner’s use of literary tech-
nique, she considered his narration of the facts in Carr v. Allison Gas 
Turbine Division,167 a sex discrimination case.  The case and the fact 
narration bear some similarity to Cecaj.  As in Cecaj, Judge Posner 
writes in Carr to reverse the trial court’s findings of facts and so we 
once again have occasion to see him devote more than ordinary care 
to the facts.168  Carr was the first woman to work in the tinsmith shop 
of General Motor’s (GM) gas turbine division.169  For five years her 
male coworkers subjected her to aggressive, hostile, sexualized, and 
derogatory remarks, which Judge Posner quotes.170  Carr fruitlessly 
and repeatedly complained to her supervisor and finally sued GM for 
sexual harassment.171 
Nussbaum compliments Judge Posner’s narration of the facts for 
“considerable literary selectivity and skill,” in particular, his ability to 
stimulate empathy in the reader for the plaintiff by techniques that 
enabled the reader to perceive the situation from her point of view.172  
Nussbaum notes that Judge Posner accomplishes this with calm and 
unsentimental prose, maintaining his position as the “judicious spec-
 166 No one can fault Judge Posner for a lack of candor about his own jurispruden-
tial stances or his approach to writing opinions: 
[D]o not infer a judge’s jurisprudential stance from the judge’s style 
without a consideration of both the content and form of the judge’s 
opinions.  Or the judge’s character.  All that a choice of style infallibly 
communicates is what the judge thinks an admirable character for a 
judge to have. 
Posner, supra note 22, at 1436.  It is too bad that casebook editors provide few refer-
ences to this sort of material. 
 167 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994), discussed in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: 
THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 104–11 (1995); Martha C. Nussbaum, Po-
ets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477, 1502–
09 (1995) [hereinafter Poets as Judges].  But see Martha Nussbaum, Carr, Before and Af-
ter: Power and Sex in Carr v. Allison Base Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1831, 1831–44 (2007) [hereinafter Carr, Before and After] (reevaluating 
Judge Posner’s approach to that case and criticizing his subsequent opinion in an-
other sexual harassment case, Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l. Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 
1995)). 
 168 See Carr, 32 F.3d at 1009–10. 
 169 Id. at 1009. 
 170 Id. at 1009–10. 
 171 Id. at 1010. 
 172 Nussbaum, Poets as Judges, supra note 167, at 1505. 
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tator.”173  Judge Posner would never indulge in the likes of Justice 
Blackmun’s “Poor Joshua!”174 
Several years later, however, Nussbaum expressed disappoint-
ment in Judge Posner,175 speculating that, despite his artful opinion 
in Carr, his apparent understanding of sexual harassment had been 
merely a visceral reaction to one particular set of facts and that, being 
undertheorized, was not reliably sustained.176  That may be. 
I think, however, that Nussbaum partially misunderstood Judge 
Posner’s rhetoric in the first place.  As he did for Cecaj, Judge Posner 
inspired reader empathy for Carr on his way to zapping his real tar-
get—incompetence.  The key to the reason for Judge Posner’s vivid 
description of the harassment comes in the conclusion: 
It is difficult for an employer to sort out charges and counter-
charges of sexual harassment among feuding employees, but we 
are dealing here with a situation in which for years one of the na-
tion’s largest enterprises found itself helpless to respond effec-
tively to an egregious campaign of sexual harassment directed at 
one woman.  No reasonable person could imagine that General 
Motors was genuinely helpless, that it did all it reasonably could 
have done.  The evidence is plain that it . . . was unprepared to 
deal with problems of sexual harassment even when those prob-
lems were rubbed in its face, and also incapable of improvising a 
solution.  Its efforts at investigation were lackluster, its disciplinary 
effort nonexistent, its remedial efforts perfunctory.  The U.S. 
Navy has been able to integrate women into the crews of warships; 
General Motors should have been able to integrate one woman 
into a tinsmith shop.177 
 173 Id. at 1507. 
 174 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 212, 213 
(1989).  Judge Posner debunks as “maudlin” Justice Blackmun’s opening line in his 
dissent in DeShaney.  Posner, supra note 22, at 1434.  He castigates Justice Blackmun 
for the “style” and especially the “voice”  Justice Blackmun used in some “opinions in 
which he expressed his heartfelt views” as “embarrassing performances precisely be-
cause they seem the unmediated expression of self.”  Id. 
 175 Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After, supra note 167, at 1831–32.  See also Mary 
Anne Case, All the World’s the Men’s Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655 (criticizing Judge 
Posner’s failure to perceive the harm in the defendant’s failure to provide toilet fa-
cilities to the sole female in an outdoor crew). 
 176 Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After, supra note 167, at 1840–41. 
 177 Nussbaum, Poets as Judges, supra note 167, at 1508 (quoting Carr v. Allison Gas 
Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 1994)) (cita-
tions omitted).  In fairness to Nussbaum, she understands the import of this particu-
lar passage as I do, quoting it and highlighting its satirical characterization of GM as 
an effort to create “well-founded indignation and contempt” for GM’s behavior.  Id. 
at 1508–09. 
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There is, then, a common subtext that one might gather from Cecaj 
and Carr—Judge Posner’s impatience with institutional incompe-
tence—and a cautionary lesson for students about inferring a judge’s 
views from emotionally powerful rhetoric.  In these cases, Judge Pos-
ner’s apparent concern for the plaintiffs’ plights may not have been 
driven so much by empathy, much less by “moralizing” disapproval of 
the abusers’ behavior, but by a pragmatic concern that is completely 
in keeping with Judge Posner’s preference for efficiency and his du-
biety that courts are competent to resolve messy social problems in-
volving contested values.  When institutions beneath the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, whether they are lower courts or corporations, 
make mistakes that bring these messy social problems into the glare 
of an appellate decision, he will be displeased. 
C. Constructing an Authoritative Voice 
The third lesson addresses possible effects of Judge Posner’s 
writing “style”178 on students and their professional attitudes and 
 178 There is no consensus definition of literary “style,” not even with respect to a 
distinction from content. 
How are we to distinguish between what a poem says and the language 
in which it says it?  On the one hand, there is no such thing as a “con-
tent” which does exist quite apart from the words; on the other hand 
the very existence of the word “style” shows that something can be said 
about the words which does not refer directly to the content.  The rela-
tion between the two must be described metaphorically; and looking at 
the metaphors that have been used, we see that they are of two kinds.  
The first suggest that the relation is mechanical, that [style] is some-
thing added, more or less at the poet’s discretion; if on the other hand 
we see the relation as closer and more intimate, we are likely to use an 
organic metaphor. 
STYLE, in PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 814 (Alex Preminger ed., 
1974).  Classical rhetoricians distinguished between “high” and “low” style and  advo-
cated for the use of particular styles for particular genres.  Id. at 815.  For instance, a 
“high” style was appropriate for epic poetry, such as the Aeneid—“Aeneas should not 
trudge out of Troy”—while a “low” style would be appropriate for satire.  Id.  We need 
not revisit the merits of this largely defunct rule to be interested by Judge Posner’s 
obvious resort on occasion to “low” style.  Judge Posner’s Aeneas might very well 
trudge.  We must leave for another time an examination of the institutional signifi-
cance of such a change.  See supra note 22 (discussing Tiersma and Popkin). 
For some recent examples of Judge Posner’s style, see Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. 
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 2007) (“‘Constructive 
trust’ is legalese for seeking to wrest ownership of a thing from its nominal owner, 
which is to say the holder of legal title.  It is not a real trust; in law, ‘constructive’ of-
ten and here means ‘fictional.’”; “All this is a great muddle.”); Moran Foods, Inc. v. 
Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436, 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2007) (“There is a ‘for 
want of a nail the kingdom was lost’ flavor to Mid-Atlantic’s theory of damages.”; “So 
on to the merits.”).  Judge Posner can be funny, at least if you are not the losing par-
ty: “It is curious to see an insurance company, in the role of insured, asking a court to 
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tones.  Judge Posner’s style, as you might expect of a judge writing 
nearly a century later, differs markedly from Justice Cardozo’s.  Jus-
tice Cardozo engaged in what Judge Posner calls “mannerism,” mean-
ing a fondness for relatively complex sentence structures and high-
toned diction.  Judge Posner uses shorter, declarative, active-voice 
sentences and colloquialisms common among well-educated English 
speakers in the United States during the second half of the twentieth 
century.179  Judge Posner calls his style “impure” to distinguish it from 
the “pure” or “high” style of more conventional judicial writers: 
Impure stylists like to pretend that what they are doing when they 
write a judicial opinion is explaining to a hypothetical audience of 
laypersons why the case is being decided in the way that it is.  
These judges eschew the “professionalizing” devices of the purist 
writer. . . .  [devices such as] the unembarrassed repetition of ob-
vious propositions, [and] the long quotations from previous cases 
to demonstrate fidelity to precedent . . . .  These and other de-
vices constitute what Robert Ferguson has felicitously summarized 
as the “rhetoric of inevitability.”180 
Writing of an opinion by Justice Holmes, Judge Posner praises the 
ability to embed 
the particular issue presented by a case in a much broader con-
text, here consisting both of the common law tradition and of the 
institutional role of courts in the scheme of American govern-
ment, [that] is characteristic of great judges.  It not only lends re-
sonance to an opinion but also connects what may be a narrow 
technical issue of interest only to lawyers—and often to precious 
few of them—with concerns shared by a broader education pub-
lic. . . .  An opinion so crafted speaks in the language of the gen-
eral intellectual community to that community. . . .  And this as-
cent from a pinched professional discourse to a sunnier upland of 
general culture can fairly be described as a stylistic characteristic 
of the great judges.  The pure style is an anodyne for thought.  
The impure style forces—well, invites—the writer to dig below the 
verbal surface of the doctrines that he is interpreting and apply-
ing. . . .  [I]f the judge is lucky, he may find, when he digs be-
make law adverse to insurance companies.”  Farmers Auto. Ins. Assoc. v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 976, 977 (7th Cir. 2007).  On the other hand, where the 
parties are not evenly matched, Judge Posner’s wittiness can seem inhumane.  For 
example, in an appeal in a personal bankruptcy case involving whether the debtor 
could shelter $2700 cash as “tangible” exempt property from the bankruptcy trustee, 
witticism struck a decidedly heartless note: “We may seem to have wandered from the 
point, which was not the metaphysics of money but the practical economies of debt 
collection.”  In re Oakley, 344 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 179 See Posner, supra note 22, at 1428–29. 
 180 Id. at 1429–30 (citing Ferguson, supra note 97, at 213–15) (citations omitted). 
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neath the verbal surface of legal doctrine, the deep springs of the 
law.181 
In the course of this paean to the impure style, Judge Posner lit into 
an opinion by his co-panelist Patricia M. Wald as an example of the 
“pure” style run amok—anodyne for thought, apparently.182  After de-
scribing the opinion’s meticulous use of a multi-factor test for an ag-
gravated offense in a drug case, Judge Posner comments ungraciously 
that the “style of the opinion retards the search for meaning.”183  He 
admitted that the opinion would be highly effective rhetoric if the 
point were to uphold the lower court’s determination of an aggra-
vated offense.184  He also acknowledged that the statute that author-
izes punishing drug dealers more heavily for using guns in connec-
tion with their drug dealing is not senseless or inoperable,185 “[b]ut its 
sensible application is not advanced by chanting a litany of relevant 
factors.”186 
I think that Judge Posner’s discursive approach combined with 
his colloquialism and the occasional “low” usage is not only vivid and 
readily intelligible but has also become a “dominant” or authoritative 
style.  William Popkin has suggested, in another context, that the style 
is “democratic,” by which Popkin must mean something like “sound-
ing open-minded.”187  That is an interesting insight, but Popkin’s 
choice of words is misleading.  Judge Posner is not democratic; as a 
judge, he could not be even if he were so inclined.  Popkin’s better 
point reflects an institutional insight: that federal judges can now af-
ford to sound relaxed and engage with alternative analyses because 
the authority of Article III courts is more stable and widely accepted 
than it was earlier in the country’s history.188  His political insight is 
 181 Id. at 1445, 1447. 
 182 Id. at 1442. 
 183 Id. (discussing United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Posner, supra note 22, at 1442. 
 186 Id. at 1447; cf. Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note 25, at 1419.  Wald, who had 
contributed a thoughtful, and much less tendentious, essay on the challenges of writ-
ing opinions, was not pleased by Judge Posner’s unannounced use of Morris as a ve-
hicle for opining on the superiority of the impure style, characterizing it as a “kami-
kaze style of discourse” neither “particularly useful or attractive.”  Wald, Reply to Judge 
Posner, supra note 25, at 1454 (noting that Judge Posner was really arguing about 
theories of judging as much as about style).  Bryan Garner, legal writing pundit, pru-
dently avoids taking sides in this pure/impure debate.  BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER ON 
LANGUAGE AND WRITING: SELECTED ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF BRYAN A. GARNER 429–30, 
591 (2009). 
 187 POPKIN, supra note 22, at 169–71. 
 188 See id. at 169–78. 
O'NEILL (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:17:41 PM 
554 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:507 
that a modern judge like Judge Posner, who is skilled enough to en-
gage in just the right measure of verbal caprice, actually increases his 
authority by doing so.  In contemporary culture, a skilled author can 
gain authority from violating grammar rules and using slang and jok-
ing.  The implied message is that he is so smart and so confident that 
he need not cloak himself in the traditional high style of institutional 
power.  For all its informality, Judge Posner’s is a rhetoric of power 
and a powerful form of rhetoric.  Judges who plod dutifully through 
their syllogisms signal deference to limited judicial roles, and perhaps 
they also signal inability to do anything more creative with the mate-
rials handed to them.  Not Judge Posner! 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. legal academy’s susceptibility to one of its own super-
stars raises the question of whether its traditional teaching materials 
and “signature pedagogy” are up to the task of teaching students the 
messages embedded in its selected texts.  This disciplinary discourse 
is self-referential.  Judge Posner, without working in his judicial ca-
pacity, could take the record for any case on appeal and write a 
“Judge Posner opinion” as instructional material.  Or, he—and many 
others—could simply write an essay describing what the judgment 
should be and why, or discourse on any number of other topics, if 
they had sufficient skill to keep the reader attentive.  Given the tradi-
tions of legal education, however, Judge Posner’s inclusion in case-
books depends precisely on his status as a judge; his status removes 
these opinions from the category of expressly didactic materials—
they represent “law.”  Thus, editors and professors can teach these 
materials mixed in with other opinions from other judges, jurisdic-
tions, and eras and preserve a fiction—a fig leaf, really—that they are 
simply presenting for students’ study just another example of an ob-
servable, external-to-the-academy phenomenon: judge-made law.  
Again, as a result of our traditions, editors and professors feel no ob-
ligation to share with students much, if any, information about this 
particularly deliberate and didactic author. 
Unbeknownst to law professors who may not have studied liter-
ary theory, the practice of case study in law schools shares a method-
ology with the “New Criticism.”  New Criticism is a literary theory that 
dominated university English departments in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, and was the theory to which Judge Posner was exposed as an 
undergraduate English major at Yale in the 1950s.  One of the lead-
ing figures in New Criticism was Cleanth Brooks, then at Yale and 
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with whom Judge Posner studied.189  In a nutshell, New Criticism was 
a reaction against the previous generation of literary criticism in 
which fictional and poetic texts were examined in light of the au-
thor’s life and times.190  Influenced by psychoanalytic theories of the 
early twentieth century, earlier critical practices attended not only to 
the text’s surface meaning but also supplemented such readings with 
speculations, gleaned from biographical information, about the au-
thor’s unconscious purposes and meanings.191  To make a gross over-
simplification, prior to the New Critics, both a text and its author 
might receive substantially equal amounts of criticism.  In contrast, 
the New Critics advocated primary attention to the text on its own 
terms and disapproved interpretations that depended upon an un-
derstanding of the author’s life and times.192  In keeping with mod-
ernist and post-modernist literary and artistic theory, the New Critics 
were less interested in the author’s intent, character, or historical 
context, than in his text and the reader’s response to it alone.193  
Similarly, Legal Realism also developed at Yale in the 1920s.  Its pro-
ponents, of course, took quite the opposite tack with respect to legal 
texts, arguing, in part, that legal actors and institutions could only be 
understood in the context of their backgrounds, historical, political, 
and economic situations.194 
Despite the influence of Legal Realism in scholarship and some 
recent efforts, like the Stories series,195 to give students a richer context 
for cases, I think most classroom “Socratic” dialogue emphasizes the 
kind of de-historicized, de-personalized analysis typical of New Criti-
cism,196 with one huge difference: law school dialogues rarely address 
rhetorical strategies, per se.  That is quite odd in a discipline and pro-
fession wedded to the interpretation of texts.  In most classrooms, at 
least in the formative first year, the text of an opinion is subjected to 
a close reading for its statement of facts, its issue definitions, the legal 
 189 MacFarquhar, supra note 34, at 84. 
 190 See, e.g., NEW CRITICISM, in PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 
567–68 (Alex Parminger ed., 1974). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 See id.; CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL WROUGHT URN 236–38 (1975). 
 194 See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 29–30 (1986). 
 195 Foundation Press has published several volumes of background “stories” for 
different doctrinal subject areas.  See, e.g., CONTRACTS STORIES, supra note 91. 
 196 This is a coincidence, not cause and effect, because Langdell invented the case 
method before New Criticism took hold.  My point is that Judge Posner’s exposure to 
New Criticism would make him more than unusually sensitive to the way in which le-
gal education suppresses the significance of the author judge in favor of a purported, 
but rather superficial, engagement with text. 
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principles invoked, and the rationale and background of important 
cases and, rarely, some information about the court and the judges 
who decided the case—but that kind of information is not the norm 
and is generally not the principal focus of classroom discussion.  Sel-
dom is any history, intellectual or political, included.197  Instead, judi-
cial opinions are presented as doctrinal artifacts whose meaning as 
“law” can and must be extracted by law students through close atten-
tion to the text with minimal reference to the life, times, or agendas 
of their authors.  Cases are organized by legal issue, not by the court, 
the jurisdiction, or the era.  While students may read several opinions 
by the same judge—especially Judge Posner—they will not read them 
together and, thus, the authorial attitudes and styles of any given 
judge will be less apparent.  Of course, this disregard of the author’s 
role is not simply a borrowed conceit from literary theory.  It is 
rooted in ideology: the goal that judges should be objective and neu-
tral.  Although practitioners and academics all know that, in practice, 
the judge matters a great deal—even if he or she is striving to be ob-
jective and neutral by whatever criterion—our teaching materials 
(except perhaps for constitutional law) subordinate discussion of that 
person’s views and their authorial techniques to exploration of doc-
trine. 
I have suggested that law schools’ reception of Judge Posner’s 
opinions casts doubt on our traditional efforts to shelter doctrine 
from author and context.  While some of what I have written may 
seem critical of Judge Posner, in truth I am awed by his accomplish-
ment—much of it achieved through his mastery of rhetoric.  To teach 
this judge’s work and to ignore his rhetorical strategies is, if nothing 
else, to miss an opportunity to improve law students’ rhetorical sensi-
tivity and facility.  Beyond this, I have suggested that attention to rhe-
torical analysis of judicial opinions is one way to reintroduce author 
and context and, in the process, enrich the intellectual content and 
practical utility of classroom instruction.  Rhetorical analysis makes 
visible the type and caliber of a judge’s craft, it permits discussion of 
her implicit assumptions, it invites consideration of her integrity, and 
it permits discrimination between the form of an argument and its 
merits. 
In conclusion, I suggest that law professors seriously consider 
whether dependence on casebooks, at least as most are currently con-
 197 The advent of supplements like the Law Stories series from Foundation Press is 
welcome, but those materials aim to provide context for the parties and their dis-
pute, and to reverse the radical, factual, and emotional decontextualization of an 
appellate opinion.  There is less focus on judges. 
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stituted, might be a bad habit.  That reading appellate judicial opin-
ions may be a questionable way to learn to be a lawyer in the United 
States is not a novel argument.  That anthologizing a substantial 
number of Judge Richard Posner’s opinions in introductory case-
books and then teaching them in an undifferentiated mix with other 
opinions might reveal an under-theorized discipline and pedagogy is 
a new argument.  To teach with so little attention to author, context, 
and rhetoric seems an odd way to go. 
